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May we someday find a balance that allows us to live in harmony with the world around us.
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Motivation_____________________________________ 
 
My motivation for writing such a unique paper that combines academic theories in 
economics, government, and sociology is not simple to explain, as it comes from many years of 
growth and exposure to so many different people and ideas. In my research I have found that 
grass roots environmental activism, although necessary, is a lot of work for little guaranteed 
return because the environmentally friendly solutions proposed are often more expensive than 
the current policy. There is also a dilemma between the present and future urgency surrounding 
issues that involve global public goods, particularly about the idea of climate change. I invite the 
reader to explore my thought process, which has ultimately driven me to research and write 
about a pragmatic way to find solutions for environmentalists and non-environmentalists with 
regard to energy. 
 Harnessing energy and using it efficiently is the key to the growth of economies, which 
promotes improvements of general welfare and quality of life. Human beings ever increasing 
stock of knowledge that enables improvements in general welfare is correlated with our initial 
ability and thereafter increasing efficiencies of harnessing energy. Most of the energy generated 
and harnessed to produce goods in modern society is provided by the burning of fossil fuels. 
Whether it is wood, coal, oil, or natural gas, these fossil fuels are dirty, meaning they release 
harmful emissions into the atmosphere when burned, such as nitrous oxide (NO), carbon 
dioxide (CO2), and sulfur dioxide (SO2), etc. These energy carrying resources are attractive 
because they are readily available commodities and have become the standard raw materials for 
energy production in many developed countries. Not only do these resources pollute our 
atmosphere and come with many hidden transaction costs, they are also finite, or ‘scarce’ in 
economic terms. There will come a day when we will run out of the juice that makes our modern 
industrial society flow. With mounting costs of purchasing these scarce, increasingly demanded 
resources and an unknown date of when they will no longer be cheaply available for our use, 
developed societies are beginning to face pressures to find alternative forms and resources for 
energy production (See Appendixes).  
 Many renewable, non-fossil fuel based energy technologies have encountered troubles 
entering the mass market against fossil fuel based technologies and will continue to face high 
entry barriers due to an uneven playing field. The commercialization of these technologies has 
been gaining much popularity as of late. The popularity is largely due to recent spikes in the 
price of oil and natural gas, caused by a rapid increase in demand by developing behemoths 
China and India, volatile distribution networks recently exposed by natural disasters, and the 
prospect of terrorists disrupting pipelines, power plants, and refineries. Not only has the 
immediate price per barrel of oil risen dramatically in recent years, the indirect costs of 
obtaining, securing, shipping, and burning fossil fuels are also increasing. For example, going to 
war to secure oil fields costs billions of dollars, the cost of shipping millions of fossil fuels is 
rising, and old, inefficient centralized power-plants are costly to maintain past their peak. The 
current energy creation and distribution network is an extremely risky, inefficient, and non-
diversified way to power industrialized nations. New technologies that have the potential to 
satisfy an increasing demand for energy and ultimately replace centralized energy must become 
competitively priced on the mass market before we find ourselves in an economic growth 
inhibiting energy crunch. I refrain from solely discussing the negative risks, externalities, and 
consequences about current energy systems in developed nations, as this would not be a 
pragmatic way to convince the world to stop utilizing highly centralized energy and fossil fuels. 
Instead I provide a model that explains how clean, decentralized alternatives that seem costly 
could be economically viable if producer’s marginal costs accurately reflected total costs endured 
by society as a result of externalities. In light of the potential probability of these dire negative 
consequences—such as global energy shortages, drastically rising energy costs, super-storms and 
flooding caused by global warming—there is promising evidence for a brighter future.  
 The wheels of capitalism are slowly turning in the early and inevitable stages of creative 
destruction. Green energy technologies are rising up against many market barriers created by 
outdated energy institutions, taking significant steps in the beginning of the transition to a 
decentralized and renewable energy-based economy. However, larger steps may be necessary to 
foster economic sustainability and growth through the transition process. Ultimately, when a 
vital resource, such as oil, becomes so scarce that the cost of using it is too high (the choke 
price) substitute resources will begin to be more readily used and, if economical, may replace the 
scarce resource. If this transition to the new resource is smoothly completed, economies will not 
suffer much during transition and will potentially benefit after equilibrium has ultimately been 
reached. Scarce fossil fuel utilization should inevitably be replaced by alternative renewable forms 
of energy due to market induced forces when the price of fossil fuels increases past the choke 
price. The smooth transition is the key to global economic sustainability and growth. Once the 
choke price is met a free capitalist market will clear by itself. Current market distortions such as 
taxes and subsidies that restrict free markets threaten the future of our society with market 
failure. These constrictions are the government’s attempts to correct for poorly defined property 
rights for public goods. Poorly defined property rights are the inherent flaw in the markets 
themselves that consequently give capitalism incentives to negatively exploit natural capital. The 
irresponsibly inefficient misuse of natural capital is threatening future economic sustainability.  
 The questions this thesis ultimately tackles are: What is wrong with the incentive 
structure laid out by government allowing capitalism to threaten future economic sustainability? 
Does the capitalist mechanism have what it takes for a smooth transition to decentralized 
renewable technologies, or are market distortions too strong to allow this change to happen 
within a reasonable time frame, or at all? What should be done to fix this problem that is 
threatening future economic sustainability? The answers to these questions are as much 
economic as they are political. Meeting the energy consumption demands of tomorrow presents 
us with questions about where best to change policy today. These policies must provide 
economic incentives that will foster increased energy creation and distribution efficiency in the 
United States. This must happen before economic growth is hindered by a possible energy 
crunch (See Appendixes). This debate is between what the government’s current stance on 
energy is and what should be their stance based on the model outline in this thesis. The current 
stance perpetuates dirty and inefficient centralized energy creation and distribution through 
subsidies and poorly defined property rights that allow for irresponsible natural capital 
exploitation. Alternatively, the creation of market incentive schemes that promote clean, 
efficient, decentralized (distributed) energy distribution would address the collective action 
problem surrounding property rights for public goods at a legislative level and encourage 
economic growth. The model outlined in this thesis suggests that the latter would improve 
societal welfare by enabling larger and more sustainable growth for developed economies.  
 Motivated by my inner passion for the widespread use and promotion of clean, efficient 
energy production for the sheer environmental benefit, I assess rising energy costs due to supply 
capacity being outpaced by demand and analyze political barriers that are distorting the energy 
market. I apply this analysis through a theoretical model that supports a change in policy by re-
defining of property rights for public goods to correct inherent flaws in the market, creating the 
incentives necessary for more efficient decentralized energy production to supersede inefficient 
centralized energy production. 
A transition from a centralized fossil fuel based global economy to a decentralized and 
renewable energy based economy presents the world with perhaps the most difficult task ever 
faced within human control. It is undoubtedly, in my opinion, up to the larger, more developed 
states to manage this transition and assure its ease, as they are the major culprits in the misuse of 
resources and energy. Perhaps it is up to the state with the biggest demand for fossil fuels to take 
the lead, using its economic hegemonic abilities to steer the rest of the world through these 
difficult evolutionary times. The United States, being the world’s largest consumer of fossil fuels, 
in my opinion, should take the wheel as early as possible making certain steps to see that the 
transition is done as quickly and painlessly as possible. For this reason, this thesis will focus on 
the energy institutions in the United States. It has become increasingly apparent, however, that 
due to the political shortsighted nature of democratic governance that create market distortions, 
current inefficient energy institutions are perpetuating beyond where free market forces say they 
should. Shortsighted political figures speak for layman citizens who aren’t overly concerned with 
issues such as global warming, urban smog, acid rain, and clean air and water scarcity because 
the effects of these negative externalities are long term and difficult to accurately quantify. 
Meanwhile the costs of these environmental problems are being incurred by the unwise citizen 
who does not have the luxury of voting for the green candidate who doesn’t promise job growth 
in his or her campaign. These costs also affect future parties, who are unable to vote, because 
they will bear the cost of long term problems. This vicious cycle may ultimately cause markets to 
fail, placing economies in dire risk of collapse.  
 Douglas North notes that, 
This human environment is divided by social scientists into discrete disciplines-
economic, political science, sociology-but the constructions of the human mind 
that we require to make sense out of the human environment do not coincide 
with these artificial categories. Our analytical frameworks must integrate insights 
derived from these artificially separate disciplines if we are to understand the 
process of change. (North, 2005) 
Therefore, as believer in free market capitalism while maintaining awareness for the environment 
and sustainability, I believe that the most pragmatic way to achieve what many environmental 
activists hope to achieve is to explore some of the things that publicly elected political figures 
can grasp and promote on the campaign trail. These include economic growth, job creation, and 
sustainability. In short, this thesis is not limited to economics because the world we live in is 
both political and economic. Therefore, this paper on the political economy of energy takes a 
unique look through the lens of new institutional economics on how capitalism, based around 
poor incentive structures, is limited in the United States, possibly allowing for markets not to 
clear at the choke price for centralized energy. I conclude with thoughts on the role government 
should play in resolving this potential problem in order to allow for change in the way of job 
creation, economic growth, and future sustainability.
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Preface________________________________________ 
We use energy in every facet of our lives. Energy enables the bonds that hold us together 
and is the force that can break those same bonds apart. Energy allows human beings to do work 
and we work to improve our individual and societal quality of life. Therefore, facilitating more 
efficient means of producing and consuming energy will improve societal welfare and quality of 
life by encouraging economic growth and improving the condition of our surrounding 
environment. Modern economies function around institutions which generate and supply 
energy. These institutions can enable economic growth and can also consequently constrict 
growth. The centralized energy institution in the United States has become a distributional coalition, due to the 
government’s attempts to create stability through stiff regulation based on ill-defined property rights, and is 
hindering the capitalist market from destroying the old inefficient energy institution in order to create newer, more 
efficient decentralized energy institutions. As stated in the title, this thesis attempts to show how 
institutional change in the energy industry can improve societal welfare through democratic free 
market capitalist mechanisms. 
 More specifically, this thesis will explore capitalism’s limited ability to destroy inefficient 
distributional coalitions and create new, more efficient institutions in the energy market. The 
legal incentive structures created for organizations to exploit in the energy industry will be 
examined through the lens of new institutionalist and collective action theories. These incentive 
structures are derived from ill-defined property rights, which have allowed for polities to erect 
poor incentive matrices, thus allowing for centralized energy to become and remain the 
predominant energy provider in the United States. I’ve chosen to use new institutional 
economics as the underlying theory for economic change because of the recognition it gives to, 
Preface
ii 
what Oliver Williamson refers to as, limited cognitive competence or bounded rationality.1 A
primary argument of this thesis, as will become more apparent in following chapters, is that 
institutions are man made constructs that are often created based on imperfect information due 
to our limited cognitive competence about property rights. As North indicates, 
The key to understanding the process of economic change is the intentionality of 
the players enacting institutional change and their comprehension of the issues. 
Throughout history and in the present world economic growth has been episodic 
because either the players’ intentions have not been societal well-being or the 
players’ comprehension of the issues has been so imperfect that the 
consequences have deviated radically from intention. (North 2005) 
 
Due to human beings’ limited cognitive competence or miscomprehension of the issues, 
intentions of human actors may have put us on an unsustainable growth track. Many of the 
public goods throughout our society, such as clean air, clean water, and biological diversity, 
haven’t been properly protected against infringement, and thus, firms have been able to exploit 
these goods belonging to the people to produce energy by inefficiently utilizing dirty fossil fuels. 
The negative externalities caused by this unsustainable system are costing society an innumerable 
sum of money, threatening societal welfare. These issues are becoming commonly accepted 
knowledge but in order for societal welfare to improve, polities must address the issue of 
property rights of public goods at the legislative level. 
 In Part I, beginning with Chapter One, I provide a basic framework for institutions and 
include some insight on institutional change, utilizing theories by North, Williamson, and Olson. 
Progressing into Chapter Two, I focus on the growth of economies because its importance to 
societal wellbeing underlies the major analysis of this thesis. The focus of these first two 
chapters emphasizes the importance that institutional change has on growth in the United States. 
However, this same theory may be applied to other developed economies as well. 
1 Among the three primary scholars in the new institutionalism economics field – Oliver Williamson, Ronald 
Coase, and Douglas North – North’s theory for institutions and institutional change is the most structurally 
outlined and will therefore serve as the primary theory for this thesis.
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 Part II begins with Chapter Three, where I will take the theoretical framework laid out in 
Chapter One and use it to analyze the formal and informal constraints, benefits, problems, and 
limitations of centralized electricity institutions. It is in this chapter where I argue that 
centralized energy has become a distributional coalition, a term that is explained in Chapter One. 
In Chapter Four I take a similar approach as the preceding chapter, discussing the emerging 
types of decentralized energy technologies, the institution of decentralized energy, benefits, 
problems, limitations, and barriers to market entry. I conclude Chapter Four by comparing and 
contrasting centralized energy with potential decentralized energy institutions that may arise as a 
result of change.  
 In Part III, beginning with Chapter Five, I examine institutional change in the energy 
industry in terms of the theory discussed in Chapter Two. I initially explore the limitations of 
free market capitalism, answering the question about its creative and destructive abilities by 
discussing issues about the uneven playing field and implications for fixing it. Despite high 
market entry barriers there are areas where capitalism is helping decentralized energy 
technologies to stay in the game but more help is necessary for a smooth transition. Following 
this, I detail and explain how promoting institutional change from centralized to decentralized 
energy could potentially allow for large-scale growth in the US and the world economy without 
much threat of instability. Concluding the paper with Chapter Six, I provide thoughts on policy 
options that would allow for institutional change. I will revisit the issue of the “un-free” market, 
questioning the government’s role in maintaining stability and enforcing redefined property 
rights, as well as its effort to rid the economy of stagnation. Based on the conclusion I have 
drawn from the theoretical model, I suggest that the rules of the game need to be restructured in 
order to improve societal wellbeing. Specifically, I propose an amendment to the United State’s 
Constitution that would give recognition and assign title to public goods such as clean air and 
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water. The amendment would call for the creation of a government backed organization to 
represent and defend the citizen’s right to these properties in a court of law, thus solving the 
collective action problem surrounding public goods. Lastly, I acknowledge some of the limits to 
the model and suggest more realistic solutions to the problems at hand that also meet the criteria 
that the model calls for. 
 
1PART I 
 
THEORY
Part I Introduction
2
Introduction____________________________________ 
Over the past twenty or so years, one of the more controversial topics in economics has 
been the emergence of new institutional economics, or a “developing sociological view of 
institutions.”i Simply put, “institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday 
life.”ii It is through the lens of new institutional economics theory that centralized and 
decentralized energy institutions are analyzed in subsequent chapters. However, before this 
analysis can be conducted the reader should understand a theory of institutions and institutional 
change. Institutional economist Douglass C. North provides an outline for a theory of 
institutions and their effects on the performance of economies. This particular theory of the new 
institutional economics gives recognition to human beings’ limited cognitive competenceiii,
which because of ill-defined property rights has led to the creation of inefficient and harmful 
institutions through poor policy incentive structures, making it an optimal base theory for this 
study. In order to make North’s theory more substantial, I turn to the theory of Mancur Olson 
to fill in some holes in the underlying theory. His theory on the collective action of rent seeking 
organizations is important to this study because it provides detailed explanations and 
implications for distributional coalitions that arise in older, more developed societies, which 
cause an overall decline in societal welfare. Chapter One outlines the Institutional Framework, 
Degree of Competition and Incentive Structures for Beneficial Institutional Evolution, and 
explains the Existence of ‘Distributional Coalitions’ in the Economy.  
 The subject of Chapter Two, The Growth of Economies, is vital to increasing the overall 
welfare of humanity. Although economic growth is essential in all societies for the betterment of 
mankind, it should be clarified that this chapter will reflect on the growth of already developed 
capitalist economies. Developing economies are different, in terms of governance and growth 
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potential, because their respective property rights structure is often not as established as in many 
developed economies. Therefore, the formal constraints distinctive to each country may not be 
mature enough to sustain long-term economic growth, thus limiting our ability to broadly 
generalize and discuss all developing economies. Chapter Two asks ‘what is capitalism?’ 
identifying the mechanism that is alleged to weed out inefficiencies in the market. This leads into 
the next section on The Free and Not So Free Market, which discusses the property rights and 
free flowing aspects that markets require to foster a healthy capitalist society. The next sections 
introduce the types of technologies responsible for large-scale and incremental economic growth 
and the adaptive efficiency of institutions that allow for these types of growth to occur. Finally 
this chapter concludes with a section on Stability, which raises the issue of how governments 
should not give priority to short term stability over long term sustainability because it may risk 
an ultimate decline in overall societal welfare. 
 
i
 New Institutionalism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_institutionalism (04/10/06)
ii North, Douglas C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge UP, 1990. P 3
iii
 Williamson, Oliver E. “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead.” Journal of 
Economic Literature Vol XXXVIII (September 2000): 595-613.
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1___________________________________________ 
 
Institutional Theory 
 
The evolution of institutions that create an hospitable environment for 
cooperative solutions to complex exchange provides for economic growth. 
(Douglas C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Growth) 
 
The reader might ask if the primary focus of this essay is to discuss economic growth 
potentials, what significance does institutional theory have? North would answer this question 
best, indicating that, “institutions affect the performance of the economy by their effect on the 
cost of exchange and production. Together with the technology employed, they determine the 
transaction and transformation (production) costs that make up total costs.”iv Without 
institutions, transaction and production costs would be too high for the economy to function. 
Although institutions are diverse in different places, the evolution of these institutions allows for 
the total cost of transactions to decrease on the condition that the environment promotes 
cooperative solutions to exchanges, thereby allowing stable economic growth.  
 The natural tendency of human beings is to maintain control and stability – this provides 
a basis for why institutions arise. North indicates that the, “major role of institutions in a society 
is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to human 
interaction.”v It is important to note what North is saying in this last statement—that stability is 
the primary objective over efficiency signifies that existing institutions may not be healthy for 
their society in the long run, but their stability allows them to perpetuate for the sake of their 
continual and reliable existence. Based on their perceptions of the world, human’s construct 
institutional frameworks made up of formal and informal constraints. Organizations arise within 
these constraints, acting as either players or officials of the game. The players interact with each 
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other and with the officials, and the degree of their interaction is based on the incentives to 
engage in contractual relationships. Through monitoring systems, officials ensure the game is 
played fairly by punishing agents for breaking the rules, whether they encroach on property 
rights and / or break contracts. Institutional change can be good for the economy because 
surrounding environments are forever changing. Therefore, it is in the interest of the economy 
for its institutions to adapt in order to increase efficiencies. Institutions change both 
incrementally and drastically, the latter occurring less often. The ability of an economy to exhibit 
prolonged sustainability is based on the level of competition and incentive structures for 
beneficial evolution. However, stagnant economies are often the victim of distributional 
coalitions, which inhibit institutional change. The following sections explore these ideas in 
further detail. 
 
Institutional Framework 
 North begins his theory by indicating that institutions are human constructs created to 
reduce uncertainty and that institutions differ from society to society. The simplest definition he 
provides is, “institutions include any form of constraints that human beings devise to shape 
human interaction.”vi The constraints he refers to are either formal, such as rules and laws, or 
informal, such as social norms, taboos, and even technologies.  
 Formal constraints “include political (and judicial) rules, economic rules, and contracts.”vii 
This particular type of constraint derives from a society’s need to enforce property rights. 
The rules descend from polities to property rights to individual contracts. 
Contracts will reflect the incentive-disincentive structure imbedded in the 
property rights structure (and the enforcement characteristics); thus the 
opportunity set of the players and the forms of organization they devise in 
specific contracts will be derived from the property rights structure.viii 
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The structure of formal constraints is what allows a society to establish itself and grow within a 
virtual structure, while at the same time confining it from acting in divergence with the rules, by 
allowing specific kinds of interaction and exchange. This tells us that supposed free societies, 
such as the United States, are not entirely free… in fact they are very restrictive of freedom in its 
literal sense. The ability to act within a system of formal constraints is often called freedom, 
despite the literal meaning of the word.  
 As indicated earlier, North repeats that “…it is important to stress that there is nothing 
in [this] argument so far about rules that implies efficiency… rules are, at least in good part, 
devised in the interests of private wellbeing rather than social well-being.”ix Societies that allow 
for the due process of reform to their structure of formal rules should be considered more 
efficient, performing more towards the interest of societal wellbeing. 
 Informal constraints are equally as important as formal constraints but are much more 
difficult to describe. Quoting Robert Sugden, North answers his question about the emergence 
of such constraints. “A pervasive but relatively simple to explain form of such constraints is 
conventions that solve coordination problems: ‘These are rules that have never been consciously 
designed and that is in everyone’s interest to keep’ (Sugden, 1986, p. 54).”x North explains that it 
is much easier to describe and be precise about formal rules than to describe and be precise 
about the structure of human interaction within a particular society. Although they originate 
from cultural traditions and taboos, informal constraints are very prevalent in the decision 
making process of individuals, making their presence ubiquitous throughout modern economies. 
After all, traditions are responsible for shaping the tastes and preferences of the consumer, 
which determine the opportunity sets in an economy. The ultimate choice sets are a reaction to 
the way the mind processes information—its limited cognitive competence.  
The way by which the mind processes information not only is the basis for the 
existence of institutions, but is a key to understanding the way informal 
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constraints play an important role in the makeup of the choice set both in the 
short-run and in the long-run evolution of societies.xi 
The short and long-run evolution of institutions, North alludes, is determined in large 
part by the opportunity sets derived by the mental processes involved in shaping a 
society’s informal constraints.2
Informal constraints both subtly and visibly exist all throughout our societies. With three 
encompassing thoughts, North says,  
[e]ven the most casual introspection suggests the pervasiveness of informal 
constraints. Arising to coordinate repeated human interaction, they are (1) 
extensions, elaborations, and modifications of formal rules, (2) socially 
sanctioned norms of behavior, and (3) internally enforced standards of conduct.xii 
Cognizant, we are, that informal constraints often originate from cultural traditions we should 
keep in mind that they will not drastically change over night. Instead they will evolve with time. 
As North explains,  
…we do know that cultural traits have tenacious survival ability and that the 
most cultural changes are incremental… Equally important is the fact that the 
informal constraints that are culturally derived will not change immediately in 
reaction to changes in the formal rules. As a result the tension between altered 
formal rules and the persisting informal constraints produces outcomes that have 
important implications for the way economies change…xiii 
If, however, an informal constraint were to be technologically derived as opposed to culturally 
derived, the constraint may be more easily alterable if a more efficient alternative were to 
displace the outdated constraint. This would also have important implications for the way the 
economy changed and will be explained further in forthcoming chapters. 
 Within institutions there exists a framework of organizations. Organizations “…are groups 
of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives.”xiv These “organizations” 
are entities that function as either players or officials. There are various different types of 
2
 Although this paper does not discuss the cognitive processes involved in human decision making, it would be 
most prudent for the reader to read North’s more recent book, Understanding the Process of Economic Change.
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organizations that emerge within different institutional structures because not all groups of 
individuals will have the same common objectives. 
A crucial distinction… is made between institutions and organizations… 
Conceptually, what must be clearly differentiated are the rules from the players. 
The purpose of the rules is to define the way the game is played. But the 
objective of the team within that set of rules is to win the game…xv 
Depending on what “game” an organization is playing, there will be different rules as well as 
objectives. The varied objectives of organizations range from the maintaining of stability and 
promotion of societal growth, as governments often do, to earn a profit, as companies often do, 
or to maximize utility, as consumer often do. It should be noted that the officials (the 
government) are the ones who write the rules to the game, but it is only “in rare cases [that] the 
government designs and enforces a set of rules of the game that encourage productive 
activity.”xvi Due to the fact that the officials write the rules while the players play the game, “the 
government has strong incentives to behave opportunistically to maximize the rents of those 
with access to the government decision-making process… the government will [thus] cartelize 
economic activity in favor of politically influential parties.”xvii The reader should note this for the 
coming section about distributional coalitions.   
 The players and officials within organizations coexist and grow together sometimes 
changing the institutional structure, depending on the overall level of interaction. North notes that 
“both what organizations come into existence and how they evolve are fundamentally influenced 
by the institutional framework. In turn they influence how the institutional framework 
evolves.”xviii Here we have a lead into how institutions change. Following this, he comments on 
how economies are influenced by institutions. Institutions have the ability to affect the 
performance of the economy because they determine the costs of exchange and production. As 
uncertainty is reduced through the structure of constraints, production and transaction costs are 
both reduced, improving the efficiency of the economy. North rhetorically ponders that “the 
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central puzzle to human history is to account for the widely divergent paths of historical change. 
How have societies diverged? What accounts for their widely disparate performance 
characteristics?”xix Societies have diverged and have boasted different performance 
characteristics because of the different levels of interaction between organizations and 
institutions. 
 Institutions have punishments for violations of their society’s respective formal and 
informal constraints. North indicates that “an essential part of the functioning of institutions is 
the costliness of ascertaining violations and the severity of punishments.”xx Once violations can 
be easily ascertained, the society’s effectiveness of monitoring the playing field for future violations 
is a good gauge of how well the institution is functioning. As noted in North’s book, most 
economic theories take enforcement as a given, however, enforcement should not be taken as a 
given. As can be imagined, however, gauging enforcement is difficult from society to society. 
What one must observe is the performance of contracts between patrons, which will indicate the 
level of transaction costs. The spectrum of performance ranges from inefficient to efficient. The 
transaction costs correlate directly from the former being most costly to the latter being least 
costly. The most efficient contracts are self-enforcing. “Contracts are self-enforcing when it pays 
the parties to live up to them—that is, in terms of the costliness of measuring and enforcing 
agreements, the benefits of living up to contracts will exceed the costs.”xxi A primary goal of 
economies is to achieve self-enforcing contracts.  
 
Degree of Competition and Incentive Structures for  
Beneficial Institutional Evolution 
 
North goes on to state that institutional change is very complicated in nature, therefore it 
is difficult to explain. Institutional change can come about from a variety of different reasons, 
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such as a change in formal rules, informal constraints, or in kinds of effective enforcement, but 
changes are rarely large and most typically occur at the margin. Change generally occurs 
incrementally because bureaucracies act as preventative forces for the rapid change of formal 
constraints. Even if formal constraints are changed, it is even more difficult and timely to change 
the informal constraints of a society because they are most often rooted in cultural traditions and 
societal norms. Although change is often slow, it does in fact occur. The direction which the 
change takes place, for better or worse, depends on the type of interaction the organizations 
share with the institution. The level of efficiency, if efficiency means that the common goal is 
overall societal benefit, determines the direction of change. If institutional change improves 
societal welfare via a reduction in total costs and better products, then the institution itself is 
efficient. 
 North questions, “what accounts for societies experiencing long-run stagnation or an 
absolute decline in economic well-being?”xxii Inefficient institutions are the cause, crippling the 
abilities of societies to become more efficient. The more pertinent question is why do they 
persist? He says that “…it is possible to explain the existence of inefficient institutions...” but it 
is difficult in explaining why the competitive pressures will not “lead to their elimination.”xxiii In 
attempting to explain the situation North writes that, 
The answer hinges on the difference between institutions and organizations and 
the interaction between them that shapes the direction of institutional change. 
Institutions, together with the standard constraints of economic theory, 
determine the opportunities in a society. Organizations are created to take 
advantage of those opportunities, and, as the organizations evolve, they alter the 
institutions.xxiv 
Therefore, the level of efficiency depends on the level of competition amongst the organizations 
and the incentive structure for beneficial evolution, which is laid out by the institutional 
framework. North then describes two assumptions by which the direction of change is shaped: 
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The resultant path of institutional change is shaped by (1) the lock-in that comes 
from the symbiotic relationship between institutions and the organizations that 
have evolved as a consequence of the incentive structure provided by those 
institutions and (2) the feedback process by which human beings perceive and 
react to changes in the opportunity set.xxv 
The symbiotic relationship referred to in the first assumption are the constraints that inhibit 
change, while the opportunity set referred to in the second assumption is the “entrepreneurs” 
perception of the idea of a less costly means for interaction versus the current system. This 
‘perception’ is again what Williamson refers to as the limited cognitive competence, or bounded 
rationality. In North’s words, “[incremental] change comes from the perceptions of the 
entrepreneurs in political and economic organizations that they could do better by altering the 
existing institutional framework at some margin.”xxvi Finally, North explains that once an 
institution becomes inefficient, it is difficult to realize alternative opportunity sets because actors 
must base decisions on incomplete information that stems from the inefficient institution. Not 
only do the players have this limited cognitive competence but it also limits the referees of the 
game who define the rules. Therefore, the rationality behind the definition of property rights 
remains bound by individuals’ perception of what they should be, not necessarily what they 
really are.  
 
Existence of ‘Distributional Coalitions’ in the Economy 
 North’s difficulty in explaining institutional change leads us to question why inefficient 
institutions exist and harm the overall welfare of society. Mancur Olson explains that in 
developed societies, as organizations and institutions evolve together, the organizations will 
grow large enough to steer institutional change for the purpose of perpetuating their own 
existence.  
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The organizations for collective action within societies that we are considering 
are therefore overwhelmingly oriented to struggles over the distribution of 
income and wealth rather than to the production of additional output—they are 
‘distributional coalitions’ (or organizations that engage in what, in one valuable 
line of literature, is called ‘rent seeking’).xxvii 
These distributional coalitions are harmful to society and, 
…have the incentive and often also the power to prevent changes that would 
deprive them of their enlarged share of the social output. To borrow an 
evocative phrase from Marx, there is an “internal contradiction” in the 
development of stable societies. This is not the contradiction that Marx claimed 
to have found, but rather an inherent conflict between the colossal economic and 
political advantages of peace and stability and the longer-term losses that come 
from the accumulating networks of distributional coalitions that can survive only 
in stable environments.xxviii 
The question then arises, why, if distributional coalitions are so harmful, are they allowed 
in developed societies to exist and inhibit other institutions from developing? North might 
answer this question by reminding us of his explanation that stability is the primary objective 
over efficiency. Olson would agree about the importance of societal stability. While 
distributional coalitions are harmful, so is instability. 
The dense network of distributional coalitions that eventually emerges in stable 
societies is harmful to economic efficiency and growth, but so is instability. 
There is no inconsistency in this; just as special-interest groups lead to 
misallocations of resources and divert attention from production to distributional 
struggle, so instability diverts resources that would otherwise have gone into 
productive long-term investments into forms of wealth that are more easily 
protected, or even into capital flights to more stable environments. On the 
whole, stable countries are more prosperous than unstable ones and this is no 
surprise. But, other things being equal, the most rapid growth will occur in 
societies that have lately experienced upheaval but are expected nonetheless to be 
stable for the foreseeable future.xxix 
In his analysis of more developed societies, Olson outlines nine implications for distributional 
coalitions. Here, only implications that pertain to this institutional outline are listed3:
3
 It would be advantageous for the reader to investigate chapter 3 of Olson’s book The Rise and Decline of 
Nations; Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities for a more thorough understanding of collective 
action theory.
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4. On balance, special interest organizations and collusions reduce efficiency and 
aggregate income in the societies in which they operate and make political life 
more divisive. 
5. Encompassing organizations have some incentive to make the society in which 
they operate more prosperous, and an incentive to redistribute income to their 
members with as little excess burden as possible, and to cease such 
redistributions unless the amount redistributed is substantial in relation to the 
social cost of the redistribution. 
6. Distributional coalitions make decisions more slowly than the individuals and 
firms of which they are comprised, tend to have crowded agendas and bargaining 
tables, and more often fix prices than quantities. 
7. Distributional coalitions slow down a society’s capacity to adopt new 
technologies and to reallocate resources in response to changing conditions, and 
thereby reduce the rate of economic growth. 
9. The accumulation of distributional coalitions increases the complexity of 
regulation, the role of government, and the complexity of understanding, and 
changes the direction of social evolution. xxx 
Implication four indicates that the presence of special interest organizations reduces the 
total income of the society in which they reside because they are not concerned with societal 
welfare. Their existence complicates the role of government because governments favor the 
short term stability that the distributional coalitions provide. The problem is that political figures 
are not accountable for long term sustainability, so by favoring short term stability they may be 
risking a reduction of societal welfare over time. Implication five indicates that if organizations 
are large enough relative to the society, encompassing as Olson puts it, incentives favor them to 
act for the benefit of society because the health of the organization and society are highly 
correlated. Implication six reflects on the distributional coalition’s inability to make quick 
decisions to the relatively nimble decision-making abilities of individuals and smaller firms. 
Implication seven indicates that the presence of distributional coalitions in a society impedes 
technological change and hence growth. Implication nine signifies the difficulty of the 
government’s role in regulating distributional coalitions, for they bring stability as well as 
stagnation, consequently changing the direction of social evolution.  
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Conclusions 
 By fusing together North, Williamson, and Olson’s works on institutions and collective 
action I present a list of theoretical criteria that I will use in my analysis of energy institutions in 
the United States. 
• The major formal and informal constraints. 
• The framework of organizations within the institution. 
• Level of interaction between organizations. 
• Punishments and monitoring systems. 
• Degree of competition and incentive structure for beneficial institutional evolution. 
• Existence of ‘distributional coalitions’ in the economy. 
 
Before I can analyze energy institutions, the reader must understand what role institutions play 
in the grand scheme of economies. The next chapter will do just that, exploring the importance 
that institutional change has on growth in developed, capitalist economies.  
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The Growth of Economies 
 
Western history is replete with examples of the rise and fall of nations and 
empires, in both absolute and relative terms. The declines are particularly 
important, because they have been propelled by institutional and 
organizational failures. 
(Elhanan Helpman, The Mystery of Economic Growth) 
 
To what can we attribute economic growth in developed capitalist societies? The answer 
to this question is not precise. For, if there were a formula that governments could implement to 
yield economic growth, all certainly would. Unfortunately, no such formula exists. Because inter-
workings of individual economies are unique and are subject to different tastes, demands, 
supplies, resources, and labor, the job of central bankers and law-makers around the world also 
are unique. Law-makers especially because they are the ones responsible for defining and 
enforcing property rights, which are a product of the bounded rationalityxxxi rooted in the 
informal constraints of each respective society. There is, however, a generalization that I would 
offer for all developed economies—stability and institutional change are vital to their perpetual 
existence and growth. This chapter focuses on the importance of both stability and institutional 
change in developed capitalist economies and why the latter is necessary for economic growth.  
 
What is Capitalism? 
 When Joseph Schumpeter published Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy he did not believe 
that capitalism could survive; yet, it has thrived more than he expected. Schumpeter takes a 
pessimistic stance while describing some key factors about capitalism that many other theorists 
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interpret in a more positive light. As a general description, “capitalism… is by nature a form or 
method of economic change and not only never is but never can be stationary.”xxxii 
Capitalism often gets demonized by its potential negatives, such as environmental 
degradation and exploitation of the poor. Capitalism, however, is only the continual process of 
organizations exploiting market incentives created by polities. Although Schumpeter may not 
agree with this statement, institutionalists might agree that the purpose and reason for capitalism 
is to enable personal freedoms and allow for the naturally equilibrated allocation of capital 
throughout a society. “Once property rights have been defined and their enforcement assured, 
the government steps aside. Resources are allocated to their highest value as the marvel of the 
market works its wonders.”xxxiii By allowing individuals to exploit ever-changing consumer 
demands, efficiencies are continually promoted throughout the system by means of innovation 
and reductions in production and transaction costs. If organizations are allowed to harm the 
general wellbeing of society without punishment, it is most likely the fault of the ill-defined 
property rights that are delineated by polities. Organizations harming the general wellbeing of 
society can also be the result of the costliness of ascertaining violations. Where self enforcing 
contracts will be less costly to enforce, non-self enforcing contracts are very costly to enforce 
therefore making it difficult to monitor and punish wrong-doers. 
 The world is not static, it is forever changing. The capitalist economic system reflects 
this continual change: “The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in 
motion comes from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of production or 
transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist 
enterprise creates.”xxxiv “Creation” cannot, however, come without destruction.  
The opening up of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organizational 
development from the craft shop and factory… illustrate the same process of 
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industrial mutation… that incessantly revolutionizes4 the economic structure from 
within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This 
process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what 
capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in.xxxv 
Creation and destruction are the two primary pillars of capitalism. These pillars do not put 
capitalist societies on a path toward socialism, as Schumpeter indicates, but instead puts them on 
a path toward obtaining the ultimate objective of freedom. Capitalist societies strive for personal 
freedoms but their efforts are often hindered by corruption. There are many confounding and 
corrupting factors that play into real-life capitalist systems. A primary corrupting factor that 
derails capitalist societies from their track to freedom is the constriction of free markets.  
 
The Free, and Not So Free, Market 
 Government-induced constrictions of free markets are reminiscent of socialist 
ideologies, where a government will attempt to centrally plan a society using capitalist 
mechanisms. Milton Friedman says that “there is an intimate connection between economics 
and politics, that only certain combinations of political and economic arrangements are possible, 
and that in particular, a society which is socialist cannot also be democratic, in the sense of 
guaranteeing individual freedom.”xxxvi The ultimate goal of a capitalist society, as Friedman would 
say, is freedom, with the individual being the ultimate entity. Although Friedman is not an 
institutionalist, the principles he outlines about the free market are recognized by institutionalists 
as very important to societal health. Individual and economic freedoms foster healthy 
democracies. “The kind of economic organization that provides economic freedom directly, 
namely, competitive capitalism, also promotes political freedom because it separates economic 
4
 Schumpeter notes here, “Those revolutions are not strictly incessant; they occur in discrete rushes which are 
separated from each other by spans of comparative quiet. The process as a whole works incessantly however, in 
the sense that there always is either revolution or absorption of the results of revolution, both together forming 
what are known as business cycles.”
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power from political power and in this way enables the one to offset the other.”xxxvii Friedman 
might agree that societies which restrict free markets are not truly democratic because 
competitive capitalism requires free markets. Government-induced constrictions of the free 
market abuse the capitalist mechanism, limiting its capacity to function properly. 
 The title of this paper refers to capitalism’s creative and destructive capacity. Why should 
one care about its creative and destructive capacity? Why should one care about anything that 
does not work properly? Without free markets, capitalism’s ability to destroy old, inefficient 
institutions and create new ones is severely limited, placing the society at hand in dire risk of 
stagnation and an absolute decline in overall welfare. The free markets must, however, function 
within a system where property rights are clearly defined and enforced. Take clean air and water 
for example, these public goods are the property of the people and should be protected against 
encroachment without compensation. If these rights are not clearly defined or enforced, 
capitalisms driving force may also steer society toward a decline in welfare, as it has in many 
cases of environmental degradation. 
 The United States likes to boast about itself as being a democratic and free market 
capitalist society. However, as explained in the previous paragraph, this can hardly be the case 
because the representative government often restricts free markets. As noted in Chapter One, 
the ‘free’ in free society does not actually imply total personal and economic freedom. It means 
that there are freedoms within a structural matrix of formal and informal constraints (political, 
economic, contractual, and social rules of the game) that allow for a society to grow. If a market 
is built upon constraints, what is a free market, and can it truly exist in a society? A free market 
can indeed exist, but only in a true and healthy democracy where individual freedoms are not 
stifled. The matrix of constraints creates the market, but transactions must be allowed to flow 
freely. Free-flowing means that there is a level playing field for all rule abiding competitors. 
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Market restrictions should only serve to enforce property rights, thereby restricting negative 
externalities potentially caused by business operations. These types of restrictions would provide 
incentives for efficient market outcomes while at the same time protecting individual rights and 
freedoms that would otherwise be encroached upon. The constraints within the matrix are not 
dissimilar from friction. Without friction, things would not be able to move or grow. Too much 
friction, however, limits movement and growth. A structural matrix of constraints, which 
evolves over time, accumulates laws, taxes and subsidies that are often too specific in regard to 
technological outcomes, thus creating too much friction. The consequence of formal constraint 
specificity will ultimately cause market failure. When the market does not clear at its natural 
equilibrium, where marginal social cost equals marginal social benefit and producers pay the total 
cost of production, disastrous impediments to sustainability arise.  
 Take for example this biological metaphor. In order for a heart to function properly 
there must be valves that provide a steady flow of blood for life to sustain itself. These valves are 
not dissimilar from the structural matrix of constraints that create a market which provides the 
production and transaction channels for the economy to be sustainable. If the valves become 
clogged, slowing the blood flow, the heart rate will slow down as well. If the valves become so 
clogged that the heart cannot get enough blood to function properly the heart will consequently 
stop beating. This too will happen if the structural matrix becomes cluttered with excessively 
specific constraints. Although institutional matrices are more complex than a heart, the 
principles of constraints and sustainable life are very similar.  
 Governments often create policies that make more friction within a system in attempts 
to foster rapid growth. They may, for example, subsidize a specific type of technology for the 
purpose of sculpting a particular technological outcome that planners believe to be superior. 
This market is not free because it involves a mix of central planning. Nor is it sustainable. When 
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a government sponsors a specific type of technology to promote rapid growth over natural 
growth, the direction of institutional change will be altered and future stability threatened. As 
North stated, the opportunities in a society are determined by institutional constraints because 
organizations will be created to take advantage of those opportunities. The evolution of these 
organizations will then alter the institutional structure, often times forming distributional 
coalitions that bring about a decline in economic wellbeing. This decline causes nations to 
become stagnant and limits their ability to adapt to an ever-changing world. By promoting 
continuous change through creation and destruction, institutional and organizational failures are 
avoided because growth is achieved naturally and sustainability through a market process. From 
my perspective, this is why we should be interested in capitalism’s creative and destructive 
capacity. 
 
Two Types of Growth  
 What is the cause of economic growth? The answer, again, is not precise. However, new 
institutionalist economic theory explains the importance of institutional change for economic 
growth. In the simplest language, a society has resources and inputs. Essentially, growth can be 
observed as a society’s increasing ability to adapt and efficiently utilize its resources and inputs. 
Elhanan Helpman, in his book The Mystery of Economic Growth, states that “… economists use the 
concept of total factor productivity (TFP) to measure the joint effectiveness of all inputs combined 
in producing output.”xxxviii The input-to-output ratio is not the same among economies and their 
rate of output growth does not equal the contribution of inputs. As Helpman points out:  
In a typical data set the growth of output exceeds the contribution of inputs. The 
difference between the rate of growth of output and the contribution of input 
growth represents the rate of growth of total factor productivity. That is, it 
represents the aggregate effect of the various forms of technological change.xxxix 
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The crucial point to take from this quote is the involvement that technological change has on 
the efficiency of utilizing inputs and its positive influence on economic growth. Economic 
growth is positively correlated with total factor productivity, of which an important determinant 
is technological change that encourages a more efficient use of inputs. Helpman, cites Simon 
Kuznets as stating: “‘since the second half of the nineteenth century, the major source of 
economic growth in the developed countries has been science-based technology-in the electrical, 
internal combustion, electronic, nuclear, and biological fields, among others.’”xl These types of 
technologies, as well as others, have been the primary cause for substantial economic growth 
since the industrial revolution. 
 There are two types of growth that, for the purpose of this thesis, are important to 
understand: incremental growth and large-scale growth. It is important to note that both types of 
growth can occur in all societies and that most of the time a society will experience incremental 
growth, if it is growing at all. A timeline of economic growth can be broken down by milestones, 
where a milestone represents a drastic technological shift. Clayton M. Christensen first coined 
the type of technology that causes these shifts as ‘disruptive technologies’ in his book The 
Innovator’s Dilemma. A disruptive technology is described as follows:  
a new technological innovation, product, or service that eventually overturns the 
existing dominant technology in the market, despite the fact that the disruptive 
technology is both radically different from the leading technology and that it 
often initially performs worse than the leading technology according to existing 
measures of performance.xli 
The term “disruptive” is explanatory of the reaction to existing technologies that become 
obsolete. This term is not intended to indicate a negative disruption to the society or its 
economy. In fact, after its implementation, the society should experience relatively larger 
economic growth because of more efficient utilization of inputs which, as a result, reduced 
production and transaction costs that come with the new technology. 
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 If a capitalist society is to continually gain new efficiencies and reduce transaction costs, 
then the growth curve of that society will be upward sloping. The slope of a society’s economic 
growth curve over time should presumably get steeper with each disruptive technology because 
of the decrease in total cost it causes. Large-scale growth is spurred by disruptive technologies. 
Technologies such as the steam engine, electricity, internal combustion engine, automobile, 
personal computer, and information technology are prime examples of disruptive technologies 
that have enabled enormous levels of economic growth:  
Each one of these inventions was drastic rather than incremental; each had the 
potential for pervasive use in a wide range of applications, each triggered  the 
development of many complimentary inputs, and each launched a prolonged 
process of adjustment that included the reorganization of the workplace.xlii 
Disruptive technologies should be encouraged through incentive schemes that allow the market 
to decide what is appropriate in democratic, free market, capitalist societies. Their creation and 
implementation is vital to the growth of economies that are seeking reductions in total costs. 
 Incremental growth occurs during the process of gaining efficiencies after a disruptive 
technology is invented and the spread of these efficiencies throughout the economy. These 
efficiencies are achieved by means of ‘sustaining technologies’xliii that improve the performance 
of the once-disruptive technology. The improvement of efficiency through the innovation of 
sustaining technologies plays a large role in determining a society’s total factor productivity, 
enabling a society to more efficiently utilize its inputs. In striving for total efficiency, disruptive 
technologies must be allowed to develop. Sustaining technologies will than incrementally allow 
for marginal increases in output, until yet another disruptive technology is invented and 
commercialized. 
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Institutional Change 
 Human beings interact through institutional structures. Often times, institutions are 
structured around a specific type of technology. The institutional network of roads and 
highways, for example, are the result of the automobile, which was a disruptive technology. 
Highway and road systems serve as both sustaining technologies as well as institutions with 
formal and informal constraints. Cars are only permitted to drive on the right side of the road 
when traffic is traveling in both directions (a formal constraint), and drivers should not exhibit 
any action with their vehicles that is in a retaliatory manor to another driver (an informal 
constraint). As explained in the previous section, people are constantly seeking to reduce costs. 
The innovation of sustaining technologies reduces costs without necessitating the creation of an 
entirely new institutional structure. However, when there is a disruptive technological innovation 
the latest technology may require new institutions to be constructed. The evolution of 
technology has proven this to be true with most disruptions. Institutional change plays an 
important role in economic growth. If institutional change did not occur, there would be 
economic stagnation and an ultimate decline in welfare because of the society’s inability to adapt 
to change.  
 Institutional change is a requisite for long-term growth, but where does it come from? 
North says that “organizations and their entrepreneurs engage in purposive activity and in that 
role are the agents of, and shape the direction of, institutional change.”xliv These organizations 
are formed in response to the institutional framework, or a game. There would be no players 
without a game, to use North’s sports analogy. How can it be assured that institutional change 
induced by organizations will be beneficial to their respective society? The level of “adaptive 
efficiency” permitted by the institutional framework plays an important role in determining this 
outcome.  
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Adaptive efficiency… is concerned with the kinds of rules that shape the way an 
economy evolves through time. It is also concerned with the willingness of a 
society to acquire knowledge and learning, to induce innovation, to undertake 
risk and creative activity of all sorts, as well as to resolve problems and 
bottlenecks of the society through time.xlv 
A society that has developed distributional coalitions may not be as willing to acquire the 
knowledge to induce innovation that spurs disruptive technologies. Distributional coalitions are 
more concerned with preserving the current technologies for the purpose of generating more 
returns. Without a properly functioning capitalist mechanism, there are no incentives for 
organizations to resolve problems and bottlenecks—as long as there are incentives to generate 
and redistribute wealth within the organization.  
 Adaptive efficiency is sculpted by the institutional framework, which is created by the 
government. According to North: 
…different institutional rules will produce different incentives for tacit 
knowledge. That is, the particular institution will not only determine the kinds of 
economic activity that will be profitable and viable, but also shape the adaptive 
efficiency of the internal structure of firms and other organizations by, for 
example, regulating entry, governance structures, and the flexibility of 
organizations.xlvi 
Tacit knowledge is knowledge that “is acquired in part by practice and can be only partially 
communicated....”xlvii If a particular institution fosters the growth of distributional coalitions and 
is not conducive to the markets adaptive efficiency, the structure of rent seeking organizations 
will grow around outdated technologies. It is up to the government to structure the institutional 
matrix, or game, as such so that the players respond to market forces as opposed to corrupting 
incentives, such as subsidies.  
The incentives embedded in the institutional framework direct the process of 
learning by doing and the development of tacit knowledge that will lead 
individuals in decision-making process to evolve systems gradually that are 
different from the ones that they had to begin with…xlviii 
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Natural evolution of the economy, which often occurs gradually, ensures sustainable growth. 
Large-scale growth should be allowed to take place due to natural market forces as opposed to 
rapid growth caused by specific government-induced incentives. North indirectly indicates why 
government should not attempt to specifically induce rapid change: 
In a world of uncertainty, no one knows the correct answer to the problems we 
confront and no one therefore can, in effect, maximize profits. The society that 
permits the maximum generation of trials will be most likely to solve problems 
through time (a familiar argument of Hayek, 1960). Adaptive efficiency, 
therefore, provides the incentives to encourage the development of decentralized 
decision-making processes that will allow societies to maximize the efforts 
required to explore alternative ways of solving problems. We must also learn 
from failures, so that change will consist of the generation of organizational trials 
and the elimination of organizational errors. There is nothing simple about this 
process, because organizational errors may be not only probabilistic, but also 
systematic, due to ideologies that may give people preferences for the kinds of 
solutions that are not oriented to adaptive efficiency.xlix 
Therefore, the best governmental policy is one that fosters adaptive efficiency through the 
enforcement of clearly and well defined property rights, which presumably restrict negative 
externalities. 
 
Stability 
 The real world is not as simple as some of these implications make it seem, making the 
job of governments extremely difficult. Democratic governments are faced with the task of 
appeasing the immediate demands and needs of the people while positioning themselves for 
long-term sustainability. While ensuring the economy’s ability to adapt and change with the 
times, there is often too heavy of an emphasis on the government’s role in maintaining short-
term stability. Helpman cites Samuel Huntington’s views on stability: 
Huntington (1968) emphasized the role of stability in the survival of regimes. But 
change per se does not appear to be harmful to regimes. Rather, change that 
results from economic growth is good for the survival of both democratic and 
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autocratic regimes, while contraction of income per capita is detrimental to the 
survival of both.l
Huntington points out that although stability is vital to the survival of regimes, lack of change 
that results in a contraction of income per capita is injurious to a nation’s survival. Despite this 
warning, nations often tend to favor the creation of interest groups that ensure stability. 
Helpman brings the discussion back to Mancur Olson’s idea of the distributional coalition that 
reduces efficiency and threatens the long-term welfare of a nation. 
…Olson suggested that the formation of interest groups does not further 
economic efficiency. Moreover, stable societies tend to accumulate more groups 
that promote their own interests. The activities of these groups then reduce 
efficiency and foster political divisiveness. Despite the fact that large 
organizations weigh the loss of aggregate efficiency against their own 
distributional gains, significant excess burden emerges in societies with such 
organized groups. They slow down the social process of decision making, erect 
entry barriers, produce complex legal and regulatory frameworks, and complicate 
the role of government. As a result they damage a society’s capacity to adopt new 
technologies and to reorganize in response to technological change. Thus they 
slow growth. In short, in stable societies the number of groups that seek 
redistributive gains grows over time and the rate of growth of income per capita 
declines.li 
This quote summarizes a point that is fundamental to this chapter. Self-interest groups 
accumulate in stable societies, such as the United States. These groups reduce efficiency and will 
corrupt law-making politicians, creating excess societal burden. The society’s ability to change is 
slowed because of specific constrictions implemented into the institutional framework which 
favor the distributional coalition. Therefore, in a country such as the United States, capitalism’s 
creative and destructive capacity to adopt new technologies and smoothly change institutions is 
hindered. This hindrance slows growth and induces a decline in per capita income, which is 
more detrimental to a society in the long-run than the attempts at maintaining stability by 
government. 
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Conclusions 
This chapter about the growth of economies coupled with the previous chapter about 
institutional theory lays the ground work for my analysis of energy institutions in the United 
States. The important points to remember from this chapter, while reading the forthcoming 
chapters, are as follows: 
• Capitalism is a creative and destructive method of economic change and is never 
stationary. It can enable personal freedoms and allows naturally equilibrated allocation of 
capital throughout a society, thus reducing production and transaction costs. 
• In order for the capitalist mechanism to function properly, markets must be free flowing, 
with restrictions that enforce well-defined property rights, thereby restricting negative 
externalities produced by businesses and consumers. 
• Capitalism fosters large-scale growth, enabled by the innovation of disruptive 
technologies, and incremental growth, enabled by the innovation of sustaining 
technologies which make the once-disruptive technology more efficient. 
• The ability of a society to quickly adapt with the times, adaptive efficiency, is a crucial 
element for institutional change and therefore long-term growth.  
• Stability is crucial to a society’s long-term sustainability, but governments should not 
attempt to foster stability in fear of institutional change because distributional coalitions 
will subsequently arise, potentially leading to a decline in overall societal welfare. 
These five points will be referenced in the upcoming chapters as theories outlined in Chapters 
One and Two are applied to energy institutions in the United States. 
The Growth of Economies
29 
Chapter Notes 
xxxi
 Williamson, Oliver E. “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead.” Journal of 
Economic Literature Vol XXXVIII (September 2000): 595-613.
xxxii Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. Harper Perennial. New York, NY. 1942.  P 
82
xxxiii
 Williamson 598
xxxiv
 Schumpeter 83
xxxv Ibid. 83
xxxvi Friedman, Milton and Rose. Free to Choose; A Personal Statement. Harcourt Inc. San Diego, New York, 
London. 1980. P 8
xxxvii Ibid. 9
xxxviii Helpman, Elhanan. The Mystery of Economic Growth. The Belkhap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Cambridge, Mass., London, England. 2004. P 20
xxxix Ibid. 22
xl Ibid. 34-35
xli
 Disruptive Technology, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disruptive_technology (04/10/06)
xlii
 Helpman 51
xliii
 Disruptive Technology, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disruptive_technology (04/10/06)
xliv
 North (1990) 73
xlv Ibid. 80
xlvi Ibid. 81
xlvii Ibid. 74
xlviii Ibid. 81
xlix Ibid. 81
l
 Helpman 132-133
li Ibid. 136-137
30 
 
PART II 
 
ENERGY INSTITUTIONS
Part II Introduction
31 
Introduction____________________________________ 
In Part I I provided the theoretical discussion necessary to analyze the institutions that 
surround one of the primary sources of economic growth: energy. In this next section I will use 
the new institutionalist theory outlined in Chapter One to analyze centralized and decentralized 
energy institutions. In Chapter Three I define centralized energy and identify its various forms. 
Through comprehensive analysis I explain why centralized electricity institutions in the United 
States have become distributional coalitions. Following this claim, I will explore the benefits, 
problems, and limitations of centralized electricity production and distribution. In Chapter Four 
I define and examine decentralized energy, identifying its various forms. Through more 
comprehensive analysis, I will determine that decentralized energy institutions have not yet, and 
likely will not after their adoption, become distributional coalitions. Thereafter I explain the 
benefits, problems, and limitations of these technologies and the future institutions that could 
develop around them. Concluding Chapter Four, I cross-examine centralized and decentralized 
energy potentials, exploring the question of why centralized energy has prevailed as the 
dominant institution, and explore the rise of decentralized energy against entry barriers. 
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3_______________________________ 
Centralized Energy 
 
Until recently, governments the world over have felt that [energy] was too 
“strategic” to be left to the vagaries of the market. In many ways, they 
have ensured that oil, gas, and electricity operated outside proper market 
principles. Decades of mismanagement, inefficiency, unnecessary pollution, 
and excessively high costs have been the result. 
(Vijay V. Vaitheeswaran, Power to the People) 
 
The principal foundation of modern economies, energy, is often taken for granted and 
yet it is critical for society to function. The institution of ‘centralized energy’ refers to the idea 
that electricity is a strategic resource that is provided in a supply driven, top  down system and 
cannot be adequately be supplied if left to the free market. The players that make up the 
organizational structure produce large quantities of energy in facilities far away from the end 
user, who is connected through a transmission grid. The two primary forms of centralized 
energy production in the United States and around the world are in the form of fossil fuel based 
electricity and oil. Although centralized oil is equally as important to economies around the 
globe as electricity, in this thesis I will focus solely on the analysis of centralized electricity 
institutions in the United States.  
 
Types of Centralized Energy 
 Fossil fuel based electricity is primarily produced in large power plants across the 
country, producing roughly 800,000 mega-watts of electricity from nearly 5,000 plantslii. Power is 
transmitted and sold through the nation’s grid of electric wires, which are connected to factories, 
businesses, homes, and learning institutions. Electricity is most often utilized after it is sent 
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through the buildings in which we live and conduct business, creating the illusion that the walls 
are filled with limitless power. Although energy seems to flow effortlessly through homes and 
places of work, seldom does the average American see how their power is actually produced and 
almost desensitized people are to the transmission of that electricity. After power is produced in 
a coal-fired, natural gas-burning, nuclear, or hydroelectric facility (although hydroelectric and 
nuclear are not fossil-fuel based), electricity is transmitted through over 250,000 milesliii of high 
and low tension power cables that line streets, highways, and sometimes open plains. 
Transformer stations allow for the high voltage electricity to be converted into low voltage 
electricity. This system works and has enabled huge success for developed countries over the 
past hundred years (although this approach has failed most of the developing world)liv.
Oil, although often synonymous with energy, is not actually a type of energy. Oil is a 
practical type of energy carrier like coal or natural gas that, among many other applications aside 
from ones energy related, allows for yet another primary foundation of modern economies: 
transportation. The network of oil, from ground pump to gas pump, is so conveniently hidden 
from most consumers that if it were not for dramatic price fluctuations caused by increases in 
demand and shocks to supply chains, it too could be as hidden as electricity generation 
networks. Oil is pumped from the ground and piped through distribution networks. From these 
networks it can be sent via cargo ship to a gasoline refinery, where it is than trucked to local gas 
stations, readily available to be purchased by automobile owners. It can also be trucked directly 
to homes where it is pumped into a tank for storage, readily available for heat generation during 
cold winter months. The production and transmission of drilled coal and natural gas are very 
similar to their liquid energy carrying counterpart, however their contribution to transportation 
does not compare to that of oil’s. Their respective applications vary, but the consumers are all 
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the same. Like fossil fuel based centralized electricity production, these systems also work and 
are irrefutable successes. 
 Despite the success of these heavily concentrated, or “centralized hub-and-spoke 
systems”lv, they are highly inefficient and come with hidden monetary costs. The hidden costs, as 
referred to in the Preface, include maintaining outdated power plants, grids, and shipping lines, 
as well as militarily securing oil fields and pipelines, and protecting nuclear power plants from 
terrorist attacks—not to mention the costs of cleaning up environmental disasters caused by 
nuclear accidents, oil spills, and the negative externality costs of pollution endured by society. 
The latter is an impossible number to accurately quantify because, aside from the positive 
correlation with increased emissions and an increase in human ailments such as respiratory 
illnesses, the inconclusive possibility of human induced global warming may be causing 
insurmountable and irreversible costs to the entire world. Vijay Vaitheeswaran, in his book Power 
to the People, indicates that the economies of scale promised by bigger power plants is what has 
enticed governments to support them and turn a blind eye toward their extremely low efficiency 
and high environmental costs. 
Many of America’s giant coal plants, for example, are well over thirty years old 
and barely manage an efficiency rate of 30 to 40 percent; in comparison, the best 
combined-heat-and-electricity micropower plants can achieve double that 
efficiency. The power industry has also ignored the losses dissipated as heat 
incurred in transporting power over wires to distant consumers, which typically 
amounts to more than a quarter of the cost of delivered electricity in developed 
countries.lvi 
In light of the previous chapter’s discussion about inefficiencies being weeded out of the market, 
the big question is why have inefficiencies in centralized energy institutions perpetuated? The 
answer: organizations that comprise centralized energy institutions in the United States 
constitute self-interested distributional coalitions that have been supported by government for 
much of the 20th century, whose inefficiencies are hindering economic growth and threatening 
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future sustainability. This next section reviews a history of centralized electricity production in 
the United States and then interprets the system through North, Williamson, and Olson’s theory 
from Chapter One. 
 
Centralized Electricity History 
 Centralized electricity is by and large an institution. Within this overarching institution 
are smaller institutions that are made up of electricity producing organizations. Both overarching 
and smaller institutions share and have unique formal and informal organizational constraints. In 
order to be officially referred to as an institution, ‘centralized energy’ must be analyzed through 
the criteria outlined in Chapter One. Before this, the reader should have an understanding of the 
history behind how centralized electricity came to be in the United States. The US Energy 
Information Administration’s most recent update on The Changing Structure of the Electric Power 
Industry 2000 provides a detailed history of legislation and governmental regulations.  
Vaitheeswaran also conveniently explains this detailed history of centralized electricity 
production in Power to the People. This summarized history can be attributed to these sources. 
 Electricity can be produced as direct current (DC) or alternating current (AC). During 
the emergence of electricity in the 19th century, there was an ugly struggle between Thomas 
Edison’s promotion of DC, which is produced in smaller quantities for local generation, and 
Nikola Tesla’s promotion of AC, which has the capability of being transmitted over long 
distances. Both forms have their benefits and disadvantages, but ultimately AC won the battle 
hands down in the late 19th century because centralized energy generators could produce large 
quantities of energy at low costs. Tesla and Edison’s rival companies rushed to bring electricity 
to the masses through miles of transmission grids, beginning the reign of top  down power 
generation and transmission.  
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 The consumer quickly shifted from local to centralized energy production, as new 
technologies like the electric motor demanded more and cheaper electricity. Samuel Insull, 
Edison’s aide, came to control Edison’s company and exploited the weak legal system’s anti-trust 
regulations, attempting to dominate the entire electricity supply system in the U.S. by 
consolidating the industry. He believed the electric industry was a “natural monopoly” and 
should not contain any competition because the one supplier would supposedly supply the 
cheapest power at the lowest unit cost. Legal representatives feared an episode similar to the 
railroad monopolies and instituted the first wave of regulation to electric utilities in the early 
1900s. This first wave, however, did not do very much regulating on the industry but rather gave 
the utilities the right to seize property as the government can in cases of eminent domain, 
making their existence almost legitimate.  
 Word of regulation led Wall Street to believe that these electric utilities were less risky, 
which allowed the utilities access to more funding at cheaper interest rates, thus allowing the 
industry to expand. What little regulation there was on the utilities was often evaded because 
individual states could not regulate interstate holdings. At this point, individual states were 
responsible for most of the regulations. By the end of the 1920s, there were a total of eight giant 
holding companies controlling roughly 75% of the electricity supply in the United States. Finally, 
under Franklin D. Roosevelt, the depression era laws were passed at the federal level as a part of 
the New Deal, totally constricting any type of market freedom in the industry. Most popular was 
the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) in 1935, which restricted holding companies 
with regards to mergers, financing, and ownership, placing them under the Securities Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC) regulation. Utilities were forced to serve all customers in their local areas 
without competition on pricing, quality, or service. Prices were set by public utility boards, not at 
the market price, but at the alleged “right” price based on the costs incurred by the utilities. 
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Despite the toll that the depression took on the economy, the electric power industry proved 
resilient to downward economic forces. 
 Congress, wanting to increase employment and secure the domestic food supply, passed 
the Rural Electrification Act (REA) in 1936. Subsidies under this piece of legislation brought 
electricity to American farmers previously too far away from the transmission grids. New Deal 
legislation also led to the construction of federally funded dams throughout the country to create 
jobs, also solidifying the government’s position with centralized power. Centralized supply 
outpaced demand through to the 1960s, with increasing capacity and decreasing costs. 
 Beginning in the 1960s, with a surge in population amongst the middle class, demand for 
electricity quickly outpaced supply as well as capacity growth. Lack of R&D in the electric power 
industry, a result of restrictions on competition, ruled out any hope for market based industry 
reform. Wide spread centralization of electricity was set in stone as the standard because of 
governmental restrictions on competition (the most notorious being the construction of nuclear 
power plants during the 1970s). Lack of competition induced R&D resulted in “decades of 
mismanagement, inefficiency, unnecessary pollution, and excessively high costs have been the 
result.”lvii 
A series of four major events from the mid ‘60s to the late ‘70s led to increasing doubt 
over state regulation: The Northeast blackout in 1965, the Clean Air Act in 1970 and 
amendments in 1977, the oil embargo from 1973-74, and the nuclear regulatory delays caused by 
the accident at Three Mile Island. Deregulation of the industry began with the passage of Public 
Utilities Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) in 1978. PURPA is known as the “catalyst for 
competition” in the electric power industry. Liberalization of energy markets continued in the 
‘90s with the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992, allowing for the expansion of non-utility 
markets. PUHCA was repealed with the 2005 Comprehensive Energy Bill, allowing holding 
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companies to once again own utilities and removing SEC regulation. However, the reemergence 
of monopolistic energy utilities is an unlikely scenario. What is more likely is a decentralization 
of the players, creating a competitive market place where new alternative forms of energy 
technologies in non-utility markets are allowed to enter the arena, most likely increasing 
efficiencies through market based competition. 
 
Centralized Electricity Institution 
Now that the reader is familiar with the development of government backed centralized 
electricity production in the United States, the analysis of the institutions will be much better 
understood. The first criterion to identify is the structure of formal and informal constraints that 
comprise the centralized electricity institution. The formal constraint structure consists of the written 
rules that create the incentive and disincentive structure within which institutions are allowed to 
grow. There are three types of written rules that comprise formal constraints: political, 
economic, and contractual. Written rules are often created in the interest of private, as opposed 
to social well-being. As noted in the previous section, PUHCA, REA, PURPA (under the 
National Energy Act of 1978), EPACT, and the 2005 Comprehensive Energy Bill comprise the 
major political rules. The incentive structures put forth by these legislations have created specific 
opportunity sets and fostered the growth of centralized electricity organizations. Where initial 
regulation constricted competition, inefficiencies were allowed to perpetuate for decades. The 
outcome of this regulation was a lack of change from the 1920s until reform began in the 1980s.  
The government and local monopolies that have long controlled the generation, 
transmission, and retail distribution of power never had much incentive to 
encourage innovation or invest in new approaches to power delivery. Since 
market forces were suppressed, the gross inefficiency of energy utilities did not 
seem to matter terribly much.lviii 
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This statement indicates that the formal constraints have not, until recently, allowed for 
competition. The degree of competition and incentive structure for beneficial evolution has been absent from 
this industry until the past two decades. The institutions that remain, even after deregulation has 
begun, are outdated, and new institutions have yet to emerge because of the lack of R&D spent 
on new technologies. 
 The informal constraints of centralized energy have been created by the tradition of readily 
available electricity that flows through the walls of buildings, homes, and factories. People make 
choices based on this informal constraint and it is embedded into our every day decision making 
mental constructs. The average person’s complacency about electricity supply denotes its very 
existence as an informal constraint. Electricity has become something people use every day 
without having to think about, just as traditions shape the way people greet each other or taboos 
restrict people from diverging from cultural norms. Readily available electricity, the product of its 
suppliers’ exploitation of formal rules, has become a socially sanctioned norm in every day life and a standard 
medium for power, making its existence both subtle and highly visible throughout modern society. Oliver 
Williamson says informal constraints “are ‘adopted’ and thereafter display a great deal of 
inertia—some because they are functional (as with conventions)” and “are pervasively linked 
with complementary institutions (formal and informal), etc.”lix People would demand electricity 
if it were gone tomorrow because of its pervasiveness throughout our society. Therefore, the 
utility of the informal constraint could not be changed over night. Electricity itself is an informal 
constraint because it has created a “…lasting grip on the way society conducts itself.”lx If 
anything were to be changed about the consumption of electricity, it would have to be the rate 
of efficiency in consumption or in generation and transmission from producer to consumer. 
These changes, however, would not disrupt the utility of the informal structure. 
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 The framework of organizations within the centralized electricity institution is not difficult to 
see. As mentioned earlier there are different types of centralized energy producing players in the 
game, comprised of coal-fired, natural gas-burning, nuclear, and hydroelectric power companies. 
By law, players are either utilities or non-utilities. The Energy Information Administration 
defines utilities as “either privately owned companies or public agencies engaged in generation, 
transmission, and / or distribution of electric power for public use.”lxi Utilities are primarily 
centralized energy producers because of the long history of government backed centralization. 
“Non-utilities are privately owned entities that generate power for their own use and / or for 
sale to utilities and others.”lxii Non-utilities are comprised of both centralized and non centralized 
energy producers because they emerged with the passage of PURPA. These two types of 
producers have two common objectives: the generation of power and the desire to earn a profit. 
The government is an organization that serves as an official to these players (the government is 
also a player in some cases, owning and operating a portion of total capacity). Its role is to 
ensure the game of producing and delivering energy is played by certain rules, so that the lights 
stay on and the producers do not take advantage of the consumer. 
 Since the passage of PUHCA, the level of interaction that the centralized energy producing 
players have had with the officiating organization was very close in that the official saw to it that 
the game was played in a specific and static way. The lack of evolution of ideas from the norm in 
the centralized energy industry from the early to the late 20th century exemplifies this constricting 
relationship. Industry players have continued to invest in capital intensive centralized projects 
that aim to generate more megawatts from one source. Since the 1980s, however, the 
constrictions have been slowly relieved, allowing the game to be played with increasing levels of 
competition.  
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 The punishment and monitoring system in the centralized energy institution has evolved over 
time. As indicated in Chapter One, the costliness of ascertaining violations is important for the 
functioning of institutions. The reason why PUHCA and other regulatory laws were established 
was to prevent privately owned “natural monopolies” from exploiting the consumer, and to 
provide incentives for the electrification of the entire country. This was, at the time, the only way 
for the government to supply the country with a “strategic resource” and keep the suppliers 
from harming consumers with high prices. Otherwise, the costliness of enforcement would be 
too high because of technological limitations. With a premature legal system based around a 
limited cognitive competence for public goods, the only perceived way to avoid consumer 
deficits was to ensure that the contracts between supplier and consumer were “fair”, which 
would help to make them self enforcing. Public utility boards arrived at a “fair” price based on 
costs endured by the utility. Unfortunately, the immediate benefit to the consumer may not have 
been worth the cost in terms of lost efficiencies and pollution caused by a lack of competition 
induced change in technologies over time. In quest for the self-enforcing contract, the state 
attempted to assure that the consumer was provided electricity because it is of strategic 
importance to growth and security, and that the consumer would pay the bills because it is more 
beneficial to pay than to be without power.  
 Since these forms of centralized energy were allowed to perpetuate without change for 
so many years, their institutions have become distributional coalitions that are harming societal 
welfare by reducing total income based on the theoretical model outlined in Chapter One. The 
underlying cause being that stability has been the government’s primary objective over 
efficiency. Centralized energy producers are rent seeking organizations that, as a collective, have 
become large enough to steer institutional change. Their existence complicates the role of 
government because stability is viewed as more important than long-term societal welfare. They 
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are large enough to have their contribution benefit society to some degree so that a symbiotic 
relationship is formed. Their presence has impeded technological change and they have an 
inability to make quick decisions like smaller organizations have. Government has had a difficult 
time regulating them because they bring about stability and stagnation, changing the direction of 
social evolution. 
 
Benefits 
 Admittedly, centralized energy has enabled many benefits to developed societies across 
the world. In countries where large sums of startup capital are available for big projects, power 
has been provided to the masses through top  down systems that function with high levels of 
reliability. Jobs have been created in the private companies that comprise the overarching 
institution and industry, contributing to economic growth. Jobs have also been created in 
desperate times of need, like during the Great Depression when the REA mandated the building 
of massive dams and establishment of cooperatives to bring power to the American farmer. The 
government has, at least for almost an entire century, fostered stability and facilitated economic 
growth, which are top priorities.  
 
Problems & Limitations 
Despite the obvious economic benefits of centralized energy production during the 
majority of the 20th century, there are many problems and limitations that present decision 
makers with some interesting challenges for the future of energy. These problems are the result 
of what Williamson calls humans “bounded rationality” about the negative externalities of 
centralized fossil fuel based energy. Pollution, caused by the emissions from the combustion of 
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fossil fuels is poisoning the earth. “Among the gases emitted during the burning of fossil fuels 
are sulfur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen oxides (NO), and carbon dioxide (CO2).”lxiii The centralized 
energy approach has also failed most of the developing world, “…where more than a billion and 
a half people still lack access to grid electricity.”lxiv Inefficiencies in centralized generation speak 
for themselves, relative to decentralized generation. Coal fired plants, which accounts for over 
50% of total electricity generation, overall reach a maximum of roughly 40% efficiency.lxv Waste 
energy in the form of heat and steam are often not utilized, making roughly 50% of the nation’s 
electricity generation half as efficient as it could be if it were generated by micropower.  
 Pollution and inefficiencies are issues plaguing the developed world, while much of the 
developing world remains in the dark (not to mention being burdened by the developed world’s 
emissions). Although these factors play a huge role in sustainability, they are not paramount to 
the central theme of this study, economic growth. According to the very first page of the 
National Energy Policy, signed in May of 2001 by Vice President Dick Cheney, consumer energy 
demand will dramatically outpace domestic energy production at current capacity growth rates 
over a projected twenty year period.lxvi Essentially, centralized supply cannot keep pace with 
projected increasing demand, limiting economic growth. Centralized energy was a creative 
endeavor that emerged in response to the problem of power scarcity and has been a large 
success. However, the perpetuation of its existence to satisfy future demand in light of obvious 
system inefficiencies is not creative and productive. Increasing demand that outpaces supply 
capacity should cause prices to increase, thereby making alternative forms of energy more 
economically attractive. But at what cost will this occur and will there be stagnation in the 
transition process? North indicates that “sometimes the way experiences have interacted with 
consciousness has led to institutions that resulted in stagnation with resultant human frustration 
in the context of more dynamic societies.”lxvii In order to prevent stagnation, the dynamic United 
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States should recognize its experience with the inefficiencies of centralized energy and respond 
to the future energy demand by looking to alternative means of energy before prices are driven 
up. Policy makers who believe that future demand should be satisfied by more capital intensive 
centralized projects should expand their bounded rationality and understand that decentralized 
technologies must be allowed to enter the market more quickly in order to facilitate a smooth 
transition.
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4_______________________________ 
Decentralized Energy 
 
Imagine a world in which power flows not from on high, but from the 
masses. In such as world, important decisions would be dictated not by the 
whims of grandees, but by the needs and wants of ordinary people. The 
price of meeting these desires would be set not by bureaucrats, but by the 
robust interplay of supply and demand. In politics, such principles are the 
cornerstones of democracy. In economics, they are the foundation of 
capitalism.  
(Vijay V. Vaitheeswaran, Power to the People) 
 
The alternative to centralized energy is decentralized energy. The institution of 
‘decentralized energy’ refers to the idea that electricity is produced relatively close to the end-
user, wherever the end-user requires it, in a demand driven, bottom  up system. There is a 
wide array of renewable, decentralized energy options that can supply the energy demands of 
virtually any consumer in any location. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) has 
identified solar, wind, geothermal, bio-mass, and hydrogen fuel cells, as major R&D areas that 
have great energy producing potential. NREL leaves out microturbines as a major R&D area but 
they too have great potential. These particular forms of decentralized energy are notable because 
they have the ability to be renewable energy producers, meaning they don’t rely on finite 
resources to continue producing power. Most of these forms of energy also have the ability to 
be emissions-free or discharge much less harmful emissions into the environment as byproducts 
relative to centralized fossil fuel based energy producers. Coupling renewable and non-emitting 
aspects makes these forms of energy sustainable for long-term societal and economic 
development. The advantages of decentralized over centralized include improved system 
efficiencies, reduced pollution, and consumer choice. 
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 The institutions that surround these types of energy production do not constitute 
distributional coalitions. This is in part because they are still in the developmental growth phase 
and haven’t yet reached a percentage of total energy capacity comparable to centralized energy in 
order to allow them pricing power. However, the primary reason is because the decentralized 
institutional structure is a bottom  up system as opposed to top  down system. Users that 
utilize decentralized energy choose where their energy is produced and do not rely on centralized 
energy producers in their region, which may not have every individual user’s interests in mind. 
Users of decentralized energy are exemplars of true freedom because of the choice that they are 
able to make with their dollar. While centralized energy achieves cost reducing economies of 
scale by producing vast amounts of energy, decentralized energy will become competitively 
priced by taking advantage of the economies of scale associated with producing a large quantity 
of power generating units such as fuel cells. The construction of this market for decentralized 
energy is demand driven as opposed to supply driven. The consumer in this market is given the 
freedom to choose which type of energy best suits them. This freedom of choice is the truest 
principle of democracy and capitalism.  
 This chapter will follow a similar format as the previous chapter. First I will discuss 
various types of decentralized energy and then analyze the overarching institutional structure for 
these technologies. In the next section I review the benefits of these technologies and the 
institution for society as a whole. Following this section I analyze the problems, limitations and 
barriers to market entry for these technologies. Concluding the chapter I will explain why 
centralized energy has evolved as the dominant institution. 
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Types of Decentralized Energy  
 Before I discuss different type of decentralized energy a point of clarification should be 
made. Thus far, this study has referred to energy and electricity. People demand energy in many 
forms, electricity being one of those forms. Often times, people use different types of energy to 
create different products to satisfy demands such as the heating and cooling of water and 
interior climate. When someone wants to heat their home they can simply turn up the 
thermostat. The same goes for cooling where someone might either turn on a fan or lower the 
thermostat. These examples use electricity to supply the consumer’s demand. A large percentage 
of the electricity demanded in the United States is for heating and cooling. Some forms of 
decentralized energy bypass the need for electricity in supplying this demand, subsequently 
decreasing the total demand for electricity and increasing system efficiency. When efficiencies 
are improved at both the supply and demand ends, there is less waste; hence greater system 
efficiency because the consumer is getting the same amount of utility by using fewer resources. 
Therefore, many of the following forms of decentralized energy are referred to as ‘energy’ as 
opposed to decentralized ‘electricity’ because they supply energy needs other than those 
electricity related. 
 Most forms of energy used today are technically a form of solar energy. Fossilized plants 
and animals from some point in history used the sun’s energy, in processes such as 
photosynthesis, and their remnants are stored in the form of fossil fuels (i.e. coal, oil, gas, etc.). 
However, the forms of solar energy referred to here are renewable direct and indirect solar 
energy used to generate electricity and heat. Currently the most widely known form of direct 
solar generated electricity uses crystalline silicon semiconductors to make photovoltaic cells (PV 
cells). This type of direct solar power utilizes PV cells to capture the suns rays and generate 
electricity on site by allowing photons emitted by the sun to knock an electron off of the 
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semiconductive material of the panel to create a current. PV cells like these are not yet 
competitively priced on a per kilowatt hour (kwh) scale, costing between 20 and 25 cents per 
kwh versus typical grid electricity in the United States that costs between 3 and 5 cents per 
kwh.lxviii Solar power is being realized in niche markets today where grid electricity is unavailable 
or unreliable, such as in very rural homes and road maintenance signs. Improvements in solar 
technology have increased efficiency to convert 15% of the suns light into electricity, a great 
improvement from cells built in the 1950s, which only achieved a maximum of 4% efficiency. 
 
New entrepreneurs are rethinking traditional solar energy technology, which for the past 
thirty years has been focused around crystalline silicon semiconductors, for a number of reasons. 
One reason being the silicon wafer market is experiencing shortages caused by increasing 
demand and driving production costs up. Aside from material shortages, the technology has a 
poor efficiency to cost ratio versus traditional energy technologies, therefore entrepreneurs are 
seeking new ways to harness the sun’s energy. Some companies are investing in transparent thin 
film technology for building integrated PV windows that use “thin layers of copper, indium and 
gallium selenide pioneered at America’s [NREL].”lxix Others are researching technologies that 
utilize mirrors to concentrate the suns power to heat a stored substance in order to create 
mechanical energy from its expansion and contraction. Organic substances and nano-
technologies are newer stage ideas and may play a large role in reducing costs and materials in 
existing technologies. Indirect solar energy is harnessed for use in applications such as heating 
pools, bathing and drinking water, as well as interior climates by means of fluid circuits. Indirect 
solar technologies have the potential to drastically reduce total electricity demand because they 
bypass the need for electricity in some heating applications. 
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 People have been harnessing the wind for thousands of years to generate mechanical 
energy and for sailing boats. Today, turbines that capture the winds energy are capable of 
generating the least costly form of renewable, decentralized electricity. Windmills come in 
varying sizes. A turbine less than one meter in diameter and a few meters high can generate a 
few hundred watts (a typical incandescent light bulb requires 60 watts). Whereas currently the 
largest turbine in the world, which is 63 meters in diameter and 123 meters high, residing off the 
coast of Denmark, generates on average enough power to provide for 5,000 homes, roughly 5 
megawatts. Wind turbines have the potential to be a very decentralized energy provider, or, in 
the case of Denmark’s 5 megawatt turbine, a less decentralized energy provider. However, it is 
still a renewable energy source, relieving dependence on finite resources. When the wind is 
blowing, turbines have the potential to generate electricity at comparable prices to coal and 
natural gas fired plants, around 5 cents per kWh, and less than centralized nuclear energy, which 
costs roughly 6 cents per kwh.lxx 
Geothermal energy can be used for generating electricity or for heating and cooling 
applications. Regarding electricity generation, geothermal energy accounts for roughly 2,800 
megawatts of capacity in the United States and costs from 4-6 cents in steam plants and 5-8 
cents in binary plants.lxxi Electricity generation in geothermal plants are often smaller scale than 
coal fired and natural gas plants, releasing only small amounts of gaseous emissions in steam 
plants and zero emissions from binary plants. The other form of geothermal energy, used for air 
and water heating and cooling, is much more decentralized than electricity generating geothermal 
technology. A home, for example, with a geothermal system requires nothing more than good 
insulation for internal climate control. Ground source heat pumps use a liquid, such as water, as 
the energy carrier in order to transmit the constant temperature beneath the earth’s surface into 
the desired application: water heating or temperature heating and cooling. Utilizing a system, 
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such as this one, decreases electricity demands that may be used for water heating and climate 
control. 
 Biomass is biological material, such as ethanol, biogas, or biodiesel, which can be easily 
substituted for conventional energy carrying materials like oil and gas.lxxii Biomass has the 
potential to be centralized or decentralized because there are so many options for use. Farmers, 
for example, that may not have access to cheap centralized energy could capture the biogas 
emitted by rotting plant or livestock waste and use it to fire microturbines for electricity. A 
microturbine is an extremely efficient rotary engine that uses the same principle as wind turbines 
to produce electricity, the difference being the fuels. Farmers also have the opportunity to 
centrally provide energy instead of food, inexpensively producing fuels, like ethanol from corn 
or switchgrass for use in today’s vehicles. 
 Hydrogen fuel cells are the holy grail of decentralized energy. By means of a chemical 
reaction between stored hydrogen and ambient oxygen, fuel cells produce electricity.  
A fuel cell is made up of a negatively charged anode on one side, a positively 
charged cathode on the other, and an electrolyte in the middle that is made up of 
an alkaline or watery acidic solution or a plastic membrane, allowing the 
electrically charged hydrogen atoms to travel from the anode to the cathode. 
Commercial fuel cells are composed of many individual cells stacked atop one 
another. Hydrogen is fed into the anode side of the cell, where a chemical 
reaction splits the hydrogen atom into a proton and an electron. Freed electrons 
exit through the external electrical circuit in the form of direct current 
electricity.lxxiii 
Emitting nothing but water vapor and heat, these silent marvels of modern technology have the 
potential to completely reorganize the way energy is distributed. The concept of the fuel cell 
dates back over one hundred years, but the technology has yet to become commercially viable 
on a scale comparable to the internal combustion engine. However in the future, the fuel cell 
could play an enormous role in meeting the demands of increasing energy consumption. Jeremy 
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Rifkin talks about hydrogen fuel cells revolutionizing the way energy is generated and distributed 
in The Hydrogen Economy, forming a network of “hydrogen energy webs,” or HEW’s. 
Today, hydrogen and the new fuel-cell distributed-generation technology are 
beginning to fuse with the computer and telecommunications revolution to 
create a wholly new economic era. The individual fuel cells that make up the 
growing distributed-generation revolution are just now being connected to one 
another with the help of sophisticated computer software, smart digital 
technologies, and internet access to form the beginnings of a distributed-energy 
web. Soon, end-users will not only produce their own electricity but be able to 
share it with others, posing a fundamental challenge to the current top-down, 
uni-directional energy regime currently in place around the world.lxxiv 
In order for this to happen, fuel cell companies must reduce the cost of their product to 
compete with centralized power generation; and, hydrogen producers must find less costly and 
more efficient ways to produce, store, and distribute hydrogen. HEW’s have the potential to 
rapidly change the energy market much like the internet did the information and media markets, 
which lead to the largest and longest uninterrupted period of economic growth in American 
history during the 1990s. 
 
Decentralized Energy Institution 
 Do decentralized energy institutions exist yet? Not comparable to that of centralized 
energy, but yes an overarching decentralized energy institution does exist and is growing. The 
primary difference is the direction of integration. The top  down system generates, transmits, 
and supplies energy from the centralized producer down to the consumer. The bottom  up
system involves the generation and direct consumption or resale of energy from the 
decentralized producer to consumer. A top  down system is supply driven, meaning that 
peoples energy demands are supplied on the terms of the centralized producer, baring the 
consumer from choice. The bottom  up, decentralized, system is demand driven, which takes 
into account the individual’s energy demands and allows for choice in the process.  
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 Although there are many small individual institutions comprising the overarching 
decentralized energy institution, they all share theses similarities, or informal constraints: bottom 
up systems, choice power to the consumer, the potential to be environmentally friendly when 
produced by renewable sources, improved system efficiencies over centralized power generation, 
and finally electricity is considered a publicly traded commodity as opposed to a centrally 
supplied resource. This last informal constraint is important to understand because when people 
begin to change their view of electricity as a centrally supplied resource to a traded commodity, 
micro-markets will begin to trade electricity openly, providing incentives for producers to find 
cheaper means to produce and trade it. Electricity cannot be stored without some type of power-
sacrificing battery—it must be produced and then consumed. For this reason, the centralized 
approach does not allow for it to be considered a commodity because the resale is always less 
valuable than the original product, making consumption the only option. If electricity were to be 
produced from the bottom  up, consumers could also be producers who trade power on 
micro-levels as if it were a publicly traded commodity. The ability to trade energy at the micro-
level is an incentive for smaller producers to find cheap ways of generating power. In order for 
these markets to emerge, investment and development needs to happen with energy information 
technology that could handle the millions of transactions that would take place. The formal 
constraints, or rules, of this type of institution would have to enforce property rights and enforce 
the contracts of these micro-markets. In order for this type of system to be sustainable, better 
and more clearly defined property rights for public goods would have to be established so that 
smaller producers would be prohibited from creating pollution.  
 The framework of organizations within the decentralized energy institution is different than 
that of the centralized energy institution because of its demand driven nature. Decentralized 
organizations consist of producers of energy technologies, consumers of those technologies, 
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producers of electricity, and consumers of that electricity. After the technology is produced and 
sold, the consumer may become both a producer and consumer of electricity. The players in this 
game are organized very differently. Where under the centralized institution the producers are 
the sole provider of power to the consumer, this decentralized institution contains producers of 
power who are also the consumer, who can also provide power to other consumers. The 
government still plays an officiating role in this institution, acting as a body to enforce contracts 
and property rights, as well as a producer of its own distributed energy. Although transaction 
costs may be higher in punishment and enforcement of micro-market contracts, developments 
in smart information technology that hold digital transaction history records will be necessary 
preventatives against violations of contract infringement. 
 The players within this demand driven market create lots of competition amongst 
themselves and will thus benefit the economy. The competitive level of interaction between 
organizations in this bottom  up institution has the potential to be much more complex than the 
top  down system because of the incentives to create new markets for trading micro-energy. 
Smart energy technologies will use real-time production and consumption sensors to allow for 
peer-to-peer energy, via a grid that is conceptually similar to the internet, enabling micro-
producers to trade energy from producer to user in a limitless number of micro-markets all over 
the country. The high rate of efficiency at which these micro-markets could demonstrate will 
allow for cost savings on the exchange and production of energy. The competitive nature of this 
institution, caused by the interaction between organizations, will be brought on by increased 
efficiencies, smart technologies, and reduced negative externalities, having a beneficial impact on 
the overall economy’s performance. An essential part of the functioning of this type of 
institution, however, is the costliness of ascertaining violations of property rights and contract 
breeching. A nationwide distributed energy infrastructure may be more difficult for the 
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government, in terms of monitoring and punishment, because there are so many more players in the 
game. Although an advantage of this high-tech system is that digital recording of energy 
transactions can be required by law to make cheating the system very difficult. The incentive not 
to cheat makes contracts self-enforcing, causing the occurrence of violations to decline, and yet 
again making the system more efficient. 
 Two factors contributing to the rise of decentralized energy against the centralized 
energy distributional coalition are product diversity and competition. There are many different 
ways to generate electricity and other forms of energy. Therefore, there are many players 
competing to develop, market, and distribute the least expensive technology. The high degree of 
competition in the decentralized energy business is providing incentives for organizations to cut 
costs, which benefits the consumer and the evolution of the institution. The efficiency level of 
the decentralized energy institution is high because of this high level of competition. There are 
two primary reasons why people are now demanding these products more than in the past. First, 
the general knowledge about the negative externalities caused by centralized energy is expanding 
people’s limited cognitive competence. In other words, people’s sense of rationality is improving 
and they are more intelligent because of it, causing them to be more democratic with the dollars 
they spend. Second, as already noted, alternatives are becoming price competitive in some niche 
markets. 
 The very nature of decentralized energy production emphasizes smaller is better. 
Distributional coalitions are organizations that will grow large enough to steer institutional 
change for the purpose of perpetuating their own existence. With many individual players in the 
bottom  up micro-energy-generating and -trading game, it is difficult to imagine one individual 
agent growing large enough to steer institutional change. The producers of the technologies that 
generate energy could potentially grow large enough to steer institutional change, however, those 
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producers are currently in a position to steer institutional change for societal benefit. Energy 
trading organizations, similar to Enron, could potentially become large enough to steer 
institutional change. Under a nationwide decentralized energy network, however, it seems more 
probable that these types of organizations could not profit unless the size of the energy traded 
were very substantial, like the energy produced from centralized sources. Decentralized energy 
technology producers are in direct competition with centralized energy producers and therefore 
have an incentive to cut costs and prices to work their products into the market, benefiting the 
consumer. If a decentralized energy distributional coalition were to arise it would occur after 
centralized energy became the higher priced alternative. When this occurs, centralized energy 
companies will be forced to restructure their business model to respect the consumer demand 
for more efficient, decentralized energy technologies. 
 
Benefits 
 There are many benefits that may come from a widespread implementation of 
decentralized energy. The paramount benefit being sustainable economic growth, achieved 
through: an ability to supply the country’s ever increasing energy demand, reduced costs from 
the economies of scale in mass production of energy-generating units, job creation, reduced 
emission and externalities, increased system efficiencies, and increased reliability. There is also 
the likely possibility of spillover benefits to developing countries from the improved technology 
R&D in energy generation. 
 According to the National Energy Policy, US energy consumption will increase 32 
percent by 2020. “Our nation’s most pressing long-term electricity challenge is to build enough 
new generation and transmission capacity to meet projected growth in demand.”lxxv Proponents 
of centralized energy are advocating the construction of new power plants, however, “even with 
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adequate generating capacity, we do not have the infrastructure to ensure reliable supply of 
electricity.”lxxvi At current generation capacity growth, there will be an energy shortfall to the 
equivalent of 1300 to 1900 new power plants by 2020 (See Appendix C). Decentralized energy 
utilization provides the potential to bypass the need for new generating and transmission 
capacity by providing for the consumer at the source of demand. Due to the very large demand 
of distributed generating units, economies of scale will be achieved not by producing large 
amounts of power but by manufacturing large amounts of units. Employment may also increase 
due to a rise in demand for generating units. Centralized energy will co-exist with decentralized 
energy until the capacity of decentralized producers outpaces demand for power. 
 Retail centralized energy prices do not reflect the real costs that society pays for in the 
production process. The negative externality costs that society indirectly pays for in a centralized 
fossil fuel based system are drastically reduced in a decentralized system, and eliminating them in 
many cases. The reduction and potential elimination of emissions consequent of decentralized 
energy could lead to an increase in monetary liquidity and disposable income for consumers and 
businesses. Increased disposable income for consumers, who represent 2/3 of the economy, will 
increase marginal spending. Reduced energy costs for businesses will allow more money to be 
put towards new plant and equipment or R&D. Reduced energy costs are very advantageous for 
sustainable economic growth over the long run. Growth will also come from the efficiencies 
found in micro-energy-generation and -trading markets as system efficiencies will increase 
reliability, reducing costs endured by the victims of blackouts. 
 
Problems, Limitations, and Barriers to Market Entry 
During the 20th century, when centralized energy reigned as the only option for 
consumers, there was little need for R&D supporting alternative energy technologies. 
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Governmental R&D budgets for energy started to decline beginning in the 1980s as markets 
were opened to foster private investment.lxxvii Decentralized energy technology investment began 
to increase at this time, however, most of these technologies haven’t been able to gain major 
market share. The cost per kilowatt for many of the previously mentioned distributed energy 
technologies is still too high for many primary applications relative to centralized energy and 
they therefore have only been able to tap small markets.  
 The centralized energy distributional coalition is presently the standard medium for mass 
power generation, preventing distributed energies from breeching the primary energy market. 
Solar generated electricity, with a current maximum efficiency of just 15% and at best costing 
four times as much as most centralized generation, is not commercially viable without long term 
financing schemes. Wind power has the most potential growth against centralized power 
because it can be competitively priced, but has its problems as well. Demand does not decline 
when the wind stops, but no wind consequently means no power generation. When there is no 
power, reliance is left on centralized plants which are not easy to quickly switch on and off. 
Sudden wind, creating lots of power, could also potentially cause gluts in the existing grid. 
Geothermal energy requires drilling and a potentially high initial capital cost that can be 
overcome by grants and long-term financing, but the payback period is known to be very 
lengthy. Biomass is promising, however, decentralized biomass electricity applications with the 
use of microturbines are only available in niche markets like farming. Hydrogen fuel cells, like 
PV paneling, are not competitively priced with centralized generation. Supply capacity is also 
limited because these technologies are still in developmental phases. These are some of the 
problems associated with the previously cited distributed energy technologies. Diversification of 
energy sources is a good solution to these problems in the transition process. 
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 Energy policy expert Howard Gellar cites nine particular barriers to market entry for 
what he cites as energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies: limited supply 
infrastructure, quality problems, insufficient information and training, misplaced incentives, lack 
of money or financing, purchasing procedures, pricing and tax barriers, regulatory and utility 
barriers, and political obstacles.lxxviii These nine barriers can also be used to describe barriers for 
the decentralized energy technologies market because of their potential to be renewable energy 
sources with higher system efficiencies relative to centralized fossil fuel based generation. 
 Due to the lack of demand for decentralized energies until the late 20th century, “energy-
efficient technologies are not produced or readily available… creating a vicious cycle where, 
because demand is low, suppliers do not make products or services available, and demand 
remains low due to limited availability.”lxxix This problem of limited supply infrastructure has been 
especially the case for photovoltaic cells and hydrogen fuel cells. Demand is low and there is also 
no central market for the demand, so market entry for suppliers is difficult due to high sales, 
marketing and transaction costs. The growing industry needs more market information to reduce 
these costs. 
 Wind turbines and photovoltaic cells occasionally do not achieve their maximum 
efficiency rating because of installations that aren’t well thought out. This issue of poor 
installation quality and energy potential is related to insufficient information and training for installing 
these types of technologies. Another issue related to insufficient information is awareness. If 
consumers aren’t aware of decentralized energy options or how these technologies could help 
reduce long-term costs than they will stick to what the standard is, centralized energy. Lack of a 
standard in the renewable decentralized energy industry opens the door to poor service and 
repair capacity.  
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 The market for energy provides misplaced incentive structures that often favor centralized 
energy because “the financial interests of those responsible for purchasing energy efficiency 
measures may not be aligned with those who would benefit from the purchase.” The upfront 
costs of implementing efficient decentralized energy systems are often more expensive than 
having centralized energy provide the power. The purchasing procedures of newly built or renovated 
buildings focus on the “least first cost, not the least life-cycle cost”lxxx of the structure. Financing 
incentives that have the potential to change the market place to favor more efficient 
decentralized energy products are currently not offered on a large enough scale to make a 
significant impact on the broader energy market. 
 Exclusionary pricing and taxes are also preventing more efficient decentralized energy 
technologies from entering the market place. Subsidies of over $140 billion to the nuclear power 
industry from 1947 to 1999 have enabled the industry to now contribute 20% of the United 
States’ electricity generation, excluding decentralized energy technologies from these markets.lxxxi 
As referred to in previous sections, centralized fossil fuel based energy prices do not reflect the 
total cost to society, in terms of negative externality costs, leading to “excessive consumption, 
relative to what would be socially desirable.”lxxxii Not only do prices not reflect total societal 
costs, they also do not provide financial incentives for efficient usage because consumers pay the 
average price instead of the marginal price for power. If it costs a utility less to produce power 
on off-peak hours, the price for these hours should be less, encouraging consumers to use more 
power during off-peak hours. Smart metering systems are not widely used, however, so 
consumers don’t have any incentive to use less during peak and more during off-peak hours. Tax 
policies also discourage efficient decentralized energy technologies that are capital intensive. 
Businesses, for example, are allowed to deduct most energy costs from their flow of revenue 
before determining their income taxes. Consumers, for example, do not pay a sales tax on fuel 
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and electricity, but do have to pay sales tax on energy efficient technologies. These taxes are 
huge barriers against capital intensive decentralized technologies from entering the market. 
 Although deregulation and privatization are helping move markets in the right direction, 
they also have the potential to exclude efficient decentralized energy. The regulatory and utility 
barriers that deregulation is designed to break are in some cases promoting top  down systems, 
which discourages the utilities from putting money or management activities towards demand 
side efficiencies. The separation of generation, transmission, and distribution into private entities 
places incentives on the sale of more electricity, not efficient usage. This also inhibits on site 
cogeneration systems because utilities do not have the incentive to buy back power at a 
reasonable rate. The utilities may also charge hefty interconnection fees, or high disconnection 
fees from the centralized grid. 
 Finally, the political barriers are one of the best examples of how distributional coalitions 
are attempting to perpetuate their own existence by altering the institutional structure. The 
centralized fossil fuel based energy industry has huge lobbies that oppose the adoption of 
restrictive measures such as carbon dioxide emissions taxes.  
These business interests have a great deal of political clout and are highly 
motivated to block the adoption of policies that are perceived to be harmful… 
The fossil fuel industries contribute heavily to political campaigns, and their 
political influence has blocked the adoption of higher energy taxes or taxes on 
carbon dioxide emissions.lxxxiii 
Geller references legislation proposed by President Bill Clinton in 1993 for the adoption of a 
small energy tax based on the British thermal unit (Btu). The bill called for a tax of 26 cents per 
million Btu’s when using coal, natural gas, or nuclear, and 61 cents per million Btu’s when using 
petroleum. This green tax would create tax free Btu’s when consumers used renewable wind, 
solar, and geothermal sources. The fossil fuel industry lobbied congress and squashed this 
legislation, exemplifying how the centralized energy distributional coalition’s political clout 
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allows them to alter the institutional structure for their own benefit, not in line with societal 
benefit. 
 Geller believes that it is possible to overcome many of these barriers through policies 
which, “eliminate price subsidies, make energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies 
readily available, improve the performance of these technologies, educate and train consumers, 
require certain levels of efficiency of renewable energy use, or provide convenient financing.”lxxxiv 
The barriers he notes that will be harder to overcome are those which give priority to low 
upfront energy costs versus low life cycle energy costs of a building. These policies are crucial 
political measures to reduce many of the barriers to market entry for decentralized energy 
technologies. The most crucial policy change that Geller does not discuss, however, is the 
redefining of property rights for public goods: clean air and water. Individuals that have the right 
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness should also have the right to clean air and water. 
 
Centralized vs. Decentralized Energy 
 If it is true that a shift from centralized to decentralized energy would in fact foster 
economic growth and sustainability, the question arises: Why has centralized energy prevailed 
over decentralized energy? The answer takes us back to what North and Williamson call human’s 
limited cognitive competence, where human’s perception of property rights at the time of 
defining them were incomplete. What does this mean? The property rights structure for the 
clean air and water public goods was not fully understood at the time energy institutions came 
into existence. So when electric utilities began to belch various types of emissions into the air, it 
was not considered an illegal infringement on individual property rights until people began to 
understand costs related to the externalities. Although Alfred Pigou wrote about The Economics of 
Welfare in 1920, followed by Ronald Coase’s work on “The Problem of Social Cost” in 1960, the 
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issues they discussed with regard to the socially optimal outcome of agents harming other agents 
were not addressed at the legislative level for the environment until clean air legislation was 
introduced to congress during the 1970s. Major issues about externality costs, social welfare, and 
property rights for clean air and water became commonly understood knowledge with the 
passage of the Clean Air Act (CAA) in 1970, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments (FWPCAA) in 1972, and the Clean Water Act (CWA) amendments in 1977. By 
this time, however, modern society had grown to revolve around the production of cheap, 
centralized electricity, presenting law-makers with the dilemma of maintaining the balance 
between stability and sustainable growth. More specifically, the dilemma was how to provide 
electricity for the masses, while ensuring the electricity providers that have enabled growth 
would not hinder future sustainability through debilitating negative externalities. The 
government took the route that, at the time, was the most rational option. Electricity is a 
strategic resource thought unlikely to be provided adequately by unregulated markets. However, 
this was the government’s bounded rationality, prohibiting them from seeing better policy 
options such as liberalizing markets, capping emissions, and auctioning tradable permits that 
allow the free market to find efficiencies. Perhaps at the time, technological limitations that 
created the government’s bounded rationality were not close to being adequate enough to allow 
for a decentralized energy infrastructure to enable the growth that the United States has seen 
under a centralized energy infrastructure. Hence, the quandary between which is more 
important: rapid growth or sustainable growth. 
 The reader should certainly not understand these statements to imply that all 
government intervention in the free market is bad for the economy because this is not the case. 
Politics play a huge role in the determination of economic activity because of the inseparable 
relationship that it shares with institutions. “Together they determine the ability of countries to 
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accumulate, to innovate, to adopt new technologies, and to reorganize in the face of 
technological change. And they shape the economic policies that either promote or hinder 
growth.”lxxxv It is the government’s role to establish clearly, well-defined property rights so that 
the institutions and markets that form will follow incentives for beneficial societal evolution 
towards natural equilibrium. Policies that do otherwise are potentially harmful to the free market 
economy because they hinder the market’s ability to find its natural equilibrium. Natural 
equilibrium being where marginal social cost is as close as possible to private costs so that there 
are minimal externalities, and that these costs equal marginal social benefit. It is government that 
spurs the development of the institutions which, 
…affect the incentives to innovate and to develop new technologies, the 
incentives to reorganize production and distribution in order to exploit new 
opportunities, and the incentives to accumulate physical and human capital. For 
these reasons institutions are more fundamental determinants of economic 
growth than R&D or capital accumulation, human or physical.lxxxvi 
Government intervention was needed in the case of electric utility holding company mergers in 
the early 1900s because it is likely that monopolies may have taken advantage of consumers. 
Government, because of its bounded rationality, supported a specific type of technology 
(centralized energy). Had other measures been taken, such as restrictions on emissions and 
inefficiencies, micropower may have prevailed as the popular institution or at least encouraged 
more R&D in decentralized energy technologies. Other measures that created incentives to 
reorganize production and distribution from centralized to decentralized may have sparked 
electricity’s transition from being a top  down supply driven strategic resource to a bottom 
up demand driven commodity. 
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Introduction____________________________________ 
As Oliver Williamson noted in his article “The New Institutional Economics: Taking 
Stock and Looking Ahead”, “[an] attribute of human actors warrants remark, and that is the 
capacity for conscious foresight.”lxxxvii Institutional change in the energy industry would be 
beneficial for job creation, economic growth, and sustainability. Re-defined property rights are 
necessary for this to be achieved to create the incentive structures for capital to flow towards 
new and developing technologies. Allowing further perpetuation of centralized energy 
distributional coalitions will prove to be detrimental to society. Williamson quotes Richard 
Dawkins on the future of societal change in lieu of limited cognitive competence, saying that it is 
the “capacity to simulate the future in imagination… [that saves] us from the worst 
consequences of the blind replicators.”lxxxviii Hopefully, through insights brought to light in this 
paper, the reader’s conscious foresight and capacity to simulate the future through the 
imagination might help save us from the worst consequences of allowing existing centralized 
energy distributional coalitions to live on without competition from decentralized energy. Future 
policies should alternatively promote change in the industry to a distributed energy generation 
based system by the incentives of redefined property rights for public goods. In Chapter Five I 
will explore what institutional change in the energy industry would entail by first discussing the 
flaw in the incentive structure allowing for centralized energy to exist, then explaining how 
capitalism is still working in favor of decentralized energy despite market barriers. Then, 
referencing theory in Chapter Two, I will explain how the transition to decentralized energy will 
cause large-scale economic growth and institutional change without sacrificing short term 
stability. In Chapter Six I conclude this thesis with my policy prescriptions based on the 
theoretical model for reshaping the entire market by redefining property rights for public goods 
Part III Introduction
68 
and creating a government backed organization to solve the collective action problem that 
prohibits the people from adequately representing themselves in defending their right to clean 
air, water, and naturally occurring climate in a court of law. Following, I discuss how this 
conclusion may not be feasible and what other policy prescriptions fit the model as well as have 
a chance for success in the real world. 
 
lxxxvii
 Williamson 601
lxxxviii Ibid. 601
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5_______________________________ 
Institutional Change in the Energy Industry 
 
Rare windows of opportunity to effect broad reform are thereby opened. 
Such “defining moments” are nevertheless the exception rather than the 
rule. At least partly because of our primitive understanding, the response 
to such opportunities is often one of “failure”. Absent such a window, 
major changes in the rules of the game occur on the order of decades or 
centuries. 
(Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking 
Stock, and Looking Ahead) 
 
Despite high market entry barriers, decentralized and renewable energy popularity is 
gaining momentum amongst many businesses and governments for reasons related to market 
opportunity and environmental responsibility. Big oil firms BP and Shell are spending billions of 
dollars on developing businesses to take advantage of future alternative energy markets such as 
solar, wind, and hydrogen. Energy conglomerate GE has independently taken steps to cut its 
CO2 emissions, as well as launch it’s “Ecomagination” theme, implying clean energy is 
commercially viable. Governments in the US, Asia, Canada, and the EU are making efforts to 
support renewable energy projects that will aid in the world’s growing demand for electricity and 
to address the controversial topic of human induced climate change. Whether it is 
environmentalism or capitalism that is driving this popularity, the players are beginning to realize 
that the game is changing. Electricity demand in the United States, in particular, is expected to 
continue increasing at a steady pace through the foreseeable future, where at current capacity 
and price, there will be a significant shortfall of supply, consequently constricting economic 
growth. Through 2020, it is projected that in order to meet the growing demand for electricity, 
the United States will need anywhere between 1,300 and 1,900 new power plants, or 
approximately one new power plant per week (See Appendix D). These capital intensive plants 
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often take years to build, making centralized energy an inadequate solution to this inevitable 
problem. Economic growth will decline and stability will be threatened unless energy institutions 
begin to change. This chapter will discuss the limitations of “free” market capitalism’s creative 
and destructive capacity over the centralized energy distributional coalition. Using theory 
outlined in Chapter Two, it will be clear by the end of this chapter how unprecedented 
economic growth will arise from leveling the energy playing field through the promotion of free 
markets, with an efficiently enforced property rights structure, for the transition to decentralized 
energy. 
 
What’s Wrong With the Playing Field and How Do We Fix It? 
The players in the energy game are not all on equal footing. Organizations in competitive 
markets are almost always playing on a field that is unbalanced due to technological innovation, 
however, the energy field is unbalanced because of government-induced forces such as subsidies, 
monopoly regulation, and poorly defined property rights. The question is: should government 
promote efficiencies by simply liberalizing the market, or should government tip the scale in 
favor of new technologies to speed the transition with renewable and decentralized subsidies? In 
answering this question, the reader must understand some of the underlying themes in this 
thesis: no one individual or group of individuals can know precisely what the consumer will 
demand like a free demand driven market can, and that the government should provide 
protection of clearly defined property rights for public goods. There will always be barriers to 
market entry for new technologies in competitive markets—the requisite for a healthy market is 
natural competition where consumer demand determines technological outcomes as opposed to 
government legislation. In order to ensure natural competition in the energy market, 
government-induced constrictions must be curbed both in favor of centralized and decentralized 
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energy technologies. Adding to North’s sports analogy, no one likes to watch a sporting event 
where the referees are blatantly favoring one team, it is always best to watch the best team win. 
 From discussion in Chapter Two, the reader knows that individual and economic 
freedoms are paths to true democracy and that societies which restrict the free market by 
supporting specific technologies in order to induce economic growth are not truly democratic, 
they consist of central planning. The United States, for example, will never truly be democratic 
unless it eliminates market restricting subsidies and monopoly regulation in the energy arena. 
These restrictions are abusing the capitalist mechanism by limiting its ability to function properly 
in response to consumer demands, placing society at risk for economic decline. By the same 
token, the free market can just as easily fail the consumer and the environment unless there are 
clear and well-defined property rights. The rules must first be re-defined to protect public goods 
to allow this market to be free flowing within the structural matrix without the threat of 
exploitation. When the energy market becomes free flowing, where the playing field is level and 
competitive for all rule abiding competitors, efficiencies will be found and investment will flow 
toward the most promising technologies. Current incentive structures are perpetuating the 
existence of inefficient technologies. Prohibiting the encroachment of public goods, specifically 
the right to clean air and water, would shift incentives toward the production of cleaner, more 
efficient technologies. Government should no longer support centralized energy production 
because it is altering natural institutional evolution, perpetuating inefficient technologies and 
hindering more efficient decentralized technologies from entering the mass market. Further 
government support of the centralized energy distributional coalition will prevent critical funds 
from flowing toward new decentralized energy technologies that can potentially supply the 
increasing demand more efficiently. The world is ever changing and capitalism is designed to 
adapt to this change based on consumer demands. Subsidies, regulation, and poorly defined 
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property rights in the energy arena, however, are severely limiting capitalism’s creative and 
destructive capacity to destroy old inefficient centralized energy institutions and create new 
efficient decentralized energy institutions.  
 What should be done to fix this problem? Unfortunately, it cannot be fixed overnight 
and will require delicate yet deliberate policy changes. Legislation cannot shock the entire market 
by constricting current centralized energy providers from producing energy before other 
decentralized providers have the capacity to supply the demand. However, the legislation needs 
to be powerful enough to encourage more investment in new technologies so that future energy 
demand will be satisfied before demand drastically exceeds supply capacity, hindering economic 
growth. The physical problems at hand are: 
1. Producers not paying the total cost of energy production. 
2. Public goods being taken without compensation. 
3. Collective action problem about public goods. 
4. Perpetuation of the socially inefficient centralized energy distributional coalition. 
5. Lack of investment in socially efficient decentralized energy technologies. 
 
All of these issues must be addressed by facilitating smooth, rather than abrupt, institutional 
change.   
 
Capitalism: Battered but Not Broken 
Capitalism’s creative and destructive capacity over the centralized energy distributional 
coalition in the United States is severely limited. However, there are a number of factors 
contributing to the push toward renewable, decentralized energy: niche markets, threat of 
resource scarcity, volatile energy costs, increasing environmental awareness and activism, and 
entrepreneurship.  
 Contributing niche markets consist of any type of energy consumer that cannot be 
connected or is too expensive to connect to the grid. Centrally produced electricity is 
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competitively priced with PV cells, wind turbines, gas fired micro-turbines, and perhaps even 
fuel cells, in some remote locations such as country homes, highway maintenance signs, newly 
erected cellular phone towers, etc. These markets are being realized by many small-cap 
decentralized energy technology firms that are desperately seeking revenue wherever they can 
sell their product in order to stay afloat while reducing production costs. As more niche markets 
expand, firms in these markets will begin to realize economies of scale and hence reduce their 
prices to levels competitive with those of primary energy markets. 
 The threat of fossil fuels depletion is very prevalent. The timing of depletion, however, is 
a hotly debated topic. Whether these resources run out in 10 years or 100 years from now, 
rapidly increasing world demand for these precious resources will ultimately deplete supplies and 
drive the prices up. The threat alone is causing energy consumers and investors to hedge their 
energy bets with alternative energy technologies that don’t require the use of fossil fuels. In early 
2006, for example, Whole Foods Market® purchased renewable wind energy credits to offset 
100% use for all its stores electricity.lxxxix Wal-Mart® has implemented renewable energy testing 
at some of its facilities, utilizing PV panels and small wind turbines, hoping that the test results 
will conclude reduced cost potential for many of its stores across the US.xc Colleges and 
Universities are taking a lead role as well. Connecticut College and Harvard are among the many 
to purchase renewable energy credits to offset their electricity demand from the grid and support 
renewable energy in other places of the country where it is economically viable.xci University of 
Minnesota at Morris is using electricity generated directly from a large wind turbine near the 
campus.xcii Even individual homeowners are taking advantage of long term financing programs, 
from companies like BP Solar and Sun Edison, which make PV paneling competitively priced 
with grid electricity.xciii 
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 The location of different fossil fuels are not evenly allocated throughout the countries of 
the world, that is to say for example regions of the world that are well endowed with reserves of 
oil are not necessarily endowed with reserves of coal.xciv Meteorological, geological, geopolitical, 
and political factors play into the cost of these commodities. Consumers in the United States 
have not only been experiencing fluctuating prices due to some of these factors but steadily 
increasing prices as well from world demand outpacing supply. Many consumers prefer to 
purchase their energy from providers who guarantee prices will remain constant for a 
preordained time. These providers are the owners of renewable sources of energy that take 
advantage of free resources, the sun and wind.  
 Environmental awareness and activism has been gaining momentum as well as scientific 
ground over the past few decades in response to irresponsible business operations that have 
abused the environment. Businesses will exploit every possible resource available to earn a profit 
even if it causes negative externalities at no fault to the competitive nature of the beast. The fault 
is on the incentive structures of the institutional matrix that does not protect against this 
exploitation. Increasing awareness and activism has improved the stock of common cognitive 
competence about the environment as well as long term sustainability for business. Some large 
corporations are addressing their sustainability by taking steps such as purchasing renewable 
decentralized energy to reduce their ecological footprint, creating demand for technologies that 
are more expensive than centralized sources of power. 
 Finally, entrepreneurship is the best example of what makes the free market so great. 
Free and private enterprise that begins with an individual idea for a product and grows into a 
technological innovation can change the way society works. People are constantly looking to 
find more efficient ways to do just about everything, not only so that they can reduce transaction 
costs but to make money. Entrepreneurship is the drive that leads to the innovation of 
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disruptive technologies like the steam engine, automobile, electricity, personal computer, 
internet, etc. The prospect of being the person to either invent or commercialize the next big 
disruptive technology is very alluring and is the reason why as long as there is money to be made 
from innovation, capitalism, no matter how battered, is not broken. 
 
Make Way for Large-Scale Growth and  
Institutional Change, Worry Not about Stability 
 If the playing field were transformed from a supply driven market to a democratic 
demand driven market, by enabling adaptive efficiency, there would be a greater chance for 
disruptive energy technologies to replace existing technologies and subsequently spur large-scale 
economic growth. Society’s adaptive efficiency will determine the pace at which organizations 
respond to technological change. Helpman indicates, “the ability of a country to grow… 
depends on its ability to accommodate such changes, and the ability to accommodate change 
depends in turn on a country’s economic and political institutions.”xcv Rules will need to be 
changed in order to induce this technological shift and institutions will need to adapt in order for 
society to accommodate the change. 
 As discussed in Chapter Two, economic growth is positively correlated with a society’s 
TFP, or increasing efficiency of utilizing inputs. TFP will dramatically increase, if technological 
change is allowed, by making the transition to decentralized energy where fewer inputs will be 
required to generate a greater output. Economic growth caused by the reorganization of energy 
institutions in the United States could potentially be as big as or larger than growth caused by 
previous science based disruptive technologies. It is possible that the next milestone on the 
timeline of economic growth will be the technological shift from centralized to decentralized 
energy technologies. The efficiency of coal fired, natural gas, or nuclear power plants may be 
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greater than that of some current individual decentralized technologies like PV paneling, 
however, this is a myopic way of analyzing efficiency. The energy lost in transmission, waste of 
fossil fuel inputs, and hidden costs to society caused by pollution and other negative 
externalities, are a few of the system inefficiencies that are often overlooked, which cost the system a 
great deal of money. A widespread use of decentralized technology would solve many of these 
system inefficiency problems, thus reducing production and transaction costs, both up front and 
hidden. The system will then experience large-scale growth, as discussed in Chapter Two, 
because the increased system efficiencies will cause the growth curve to become steeper. The 
marginal economic growth that society is currently experiencing is being caused by the tail end 
of centralized energy sustaining technologies whose supply will soon be outpaced by increasing 
demand. 
 The barriers to market entry are too high at current energy prices to support widespread 
institutional change. In order for disruptive decentralized energy technologies to break down all 
barriers to market entry society must improve its adaptive efficiency, which will allow for 
institutional change to occur. The barriers to entry explained in Chapter Four are what North 
would call a bottleneck that society must resolve so that growth is not stifled. This bottleneck is 
due to organizational path dependence, which North explains is difficult to alter. 
The difficulty of fundamentally altering paths is evident and suggests that the 
learning process by which we arrive at today’s institutions constrains future 
choices. It is more than simply that the organizations brought into existence by 
the existing institutional matrix owe their survival and well-being to that matrix 
and therefore will attempt to prevent changes that would adversely affect their 
well-being. It is also that the belief system underlying the institutional matrix will 
deter radical change.xcvi 
Improved adaptive efficiency will help society to diverge from its current centralized energy path 
dependence. How can society improve it’s adaptive efficiency? Adaptive efficiency is comprised 
of a few primary elements: the institutional framework or rules that shape an economy by 
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providing incentives, the willingness of society to undertake change through acquiring 
knowledge from innovation, undertaking risk, encouraging creativity, and a willingness to resolve 
bottlenecks. The United States’ adaptive efficiency, which is limited by a very large distributional 
centralized energy coalition, will not improve unless the incentives provided by the institutional 
structure are changed to level the energy playing field. As Helpman indicated, if society’s 
economic and political institutions cannot accommodate such changes presented by 
technological innovation the country’s economy will have a difficult time growing. The current 
institutional framework has been conducive to the growth of centralized energy, consequently 
leading to the development of an outdated technological distributional coalition. A restructuring 
of the rules to protect property rights of public goods would give the market incentives to 
improve adaptive efficiency, causing organizations to change their business models in favor of 
natural competition based on the learning by doing and the development of tacit knowledge for 
improved technologies. This would ultimately cause the economy to experience large-scale 
growth due to disruptive energy technologies commercialized through natural market forces. 
This natural evolutionary growth of the economy caused by the maximum generation of free 
flowing market trials is more sustainable than rapid growth caused by specific government-
induced incentives for specific technologies because in a world of uncertainty, no one individual 
knows the answer to the problems we face. 
 Polities need not worry about the threat of creating instability by changing the 
fundamental rules of the game. Short-term stability will remain if proper steps are taken to 
induce the transition, however, this goal becomes insignificant if the system is not sustainable in 
the long run. The growth and stability that the United States has been able to experience due to 
government regulated centralized energy since the early 1900s is irrefutable. However, because 
the institution has slowed down society’s decision making process, erected entry barriers for new 
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disruptive technologies, required complex legal and regulatory frameworks, complicated the role 
of government, and damaged capitalism’s ability to bring new technologies to market in a time 
when demand is outpacing supply capacity, it has crippled the economy’s adaptive efficiency and 
thus it’s ability to grow. As Huntington indicated, stability is vital but change is not necessarily 
harmful to society. Change that comes from natural economic growth in particular is in fact 
good for the survival of regimes, where a lack of change resulting in a decline in per capita 
income is detrimental to survival. Natural economic growth is usually a gradual process, 
indicating that once large-scale growth is experienced from a new disruptive technology, society 
will develop sustaining technologies and become economically and institutionally stable once 
institutional change has taken place. Therefore, with the daunting task of providing a nation with 
enough energy capacity to satisfy its ever-increasing demand at hand, polities need not worry 
about short-term stability but instead shift gears and start thinking about long-term 
sustainability. Further support of centralized energy could threaten sustainability because the rate 
of growth of income per capita will decline if the rising costs of energy and the negative 
externalities caused in its production continue to take money out of people’s pockets. 
 
A Glimpse of the Future 
Taking giant steps without being able to see where one is going is a daunting and risky 
endeavor. Therefore it is no wonder why one might be skeptical about the alleged improvements 
in societal welfare spoken about in this paper after the proposed drastic institutional change has 
occurred. What would a society look like after such a transition? Perhaps something seemingly 
out of a futuristic science fiction novel, however, the future is upon us. 
 Prince Edward Island (PEI) rests off the eastern coast of Canada. Its economy imports 
nearly everything that it consumes, including the resources to generate energy. Wishing to relieve 
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itself from costly imported energy, the PEI Energy Corporation partnered with Canadian fuel 
cell maker Hydrogenics to evaluate the PEI energy system and come up with a more efficient 
solution. The island’s most abundant natural resource is wind, so naturally the energy companies 
decided to use this green resource for electricity production. What they came up with is a wind 
to hydrogen village energy system. Wind farms at the northern most tip of the island generate 
electricity that feeds the grid and is used to electrolyze water into hydrogen and oxygen.xcvii The 
oxygen is sold as a commercial gas and the hydrogen is stored and shipped to local automotive 
refueling stations for fuel cell or internal combustion powered cars. Since wind is an intermittent 
power supply and cannot supply uninterruptible power, the hydrogen can also be used to store 
the wind’s energy for use by fuel cells in micro-energy markets. This energy restructuring relieves 
PEI’s dependence on foreign energy sources and creates jobs in the restructuring process. 
Money is kept on the island as opposed to sending it offshore for energy, freeing up capital for 
economic growth and thus increasing wealth. Using hydrogen, as opposed to fossil fuels, as a 
primary energy carrier is beneficial to the environment. Overall, societal welfare is improved as a 
result of restructuring PEI’s energy system. 
 This is just one case where the ideas brought to life in this thesis are actually being 
implemented today. In the future the grid will exist only for the purpose of trading energy on 
micro-levels. High tension power lines that mar the landscape will no longer exist because 
centralized energy providers will no longer be the least costly provider of energy. The most 
centralized energy providers of the future will be wind farms. Wind farms are renewable energy 
providers that will generate the electricity necessary to electrolyze water into hydrogen and 
oxygen, which are clean storage mediums for energy. The hydrogen generated by the wind farms 
will be shipped to local refueling stations for fuel cell powered Hypercarsxcviii. The hypercar 
concept is an ultra-light hybrid vehicle that weighs two to three times less than conventional 
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steel cars, has ultra-low drag, and is powered by efficient hybrid electric systems that require 
much less power than that of steel vehicles because of weight savings. “Since the average car is 
parked 96 percent of the time…” a hypercar that runs on a hydrogen fuel cell could be plugged 
into an intelligent Hydrogen Energy Web (HEW) “…during non-use hours, to the home, office, 
or main interactive electricity network, providing premium electricity back to the grid”xcix turning 
the car into a zero harmful emissions micro-power plant on wheels.  
If just a small percentage of drivers used their vehicles as power plants to sell 
energy back to the grid, most of the power plants in the country would be 
eliminated altogether. This is because a hydrogen-fuel-cell-powered 
transportation fleet of 200 million vehicles has four times the generating capacity 
of the entire national power grid.c
During the transition period from today’s conventional automobiles to hypercars, PV paneling 
can provide intermittent power when energy from the hypercar supplied HEW is unavailable. 
Real-time energy meters can account for personal energy usage to the micro-second, and 
whether energy is produced by the consumer or by the a micro-network, the meter would charge 
the user whatever the current rate relative to the cost to produce the power, providing incentives 
for conservation. 
 This type of decentralized supply driven market for electricity frees up capital for 
economic growth. Economic development in the form of job creation will be in the wind, solar, 
fuel cell, information technology, and micro-energy trading industries. No dollars will be 
exported for energy resources that are currently purchased from politically unstable regions of 
the planet. Keeping dollars at home, as is happening in the PEI case, increases wealth, and 
provides a path toward environmental improvement. An entirely decentralized, renewable 
energy system such as this will have a dramatically reduced environmental impact relative to the 
current centralized, fossil fuel based system. With virtually no emissions, the negative externality 
cost of the old system are dramatically reduced. The threat of human induced global warming is 
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reduced because of the reduction of green house gas emissions. There will be improved air 
quality because of a reduction of nitrous oxides and other gasses contributing to urban smog. 
There will also be an improvement in water quality because of a reduction of sulfur emissions 
that are known to cause acid rain. Not only does this new system improve our own 
environment, it also has a huge positive impact on the global environment. Down stream issues 
related to long range transboundary air and water pollution are reduced as a result of this 
improvement. Increased demand for green energy technologies in the developed world will drive 
the price of these technologies down, potentially enabling technology spillover into developing 
countries due to price competitiveness. A reorganization of energy institutions in the developing 
world may solve an overwhelming number of problems that face the world today, improving 
global societal welfare. 
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6_______________________________ 
Policy Recommendations  
 
…a private enterprise system cannot function properly unless property 
rights are created in resources, and, when this is done, someone wishing to 
use a resource has to pay the owner to obtain it. Chaos disappears; and so 
does the government except that a legal system to define property rights and 
to arbitrate disputes is, of course, necessary.” 
(Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications Commission) 
 
Ideas raised by Pigou (1920) and Coase (1960) in their works on welfare and social costs 
did not have a significant impact on environmental legislation until the 1970s. Common place 
perception of property was not as fully developed as it is today at the time when centralized 
fossil fuel based energy began to emerge as the nation’s dominant electricity provider. Yet the 
United States still does not have a clearly-defined, well-specified set of property rights with 
regards to public goods (air, water, climate, etc.). Until these rights are established, organizations 
will continue to alter the institutional landscape by negatively exploiting property belonging to 
the public, causing markets to ultimately fail.  
The development of well-specified property rights… will make the overall 
environment more predictable but will increase uncertainty for those who 
traditionally have used the land in question without having formal title. Hence an 
essential question we must ask is, who makes the rules and for whom and what 
are their objectives? There is no necessary identification between institutions and 
efficiency as economists use (and misuse) the term. Indeed one of the major 
puzzles to be explained is how, and under what conditions, humans create the 
conditions necessary that make for markets with low costs of transacting and 
increase material well-being.ci 
Those who have been using these public goods without title and their investors will be forced to 
invest in cleaner technologies, resources, and lesser cost solutions for generating energy. I 
propose that the government establish these rules via Constitutional Amendment specifying to 
whom these goods belong, for the purpose of promoting efficiency and sustainability. The 
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objective is to create the incentives for new institutions to emerge that make markets work more 
efficiently and reduce transaction costs, thus improving societal welfare. The energy market is 
not free because reliable access to energy has for so long been perceived to be a natural 
monopoly that government has an obligation to provide, which is consequently carried out by 
the support of centralized energy. Market barriers are hindering emerging technologies from 
becoming competitively priced in this environment. Removing these barriers will change the 
incentive structure, garnering new developments in renewable, alternative, and decentralized 
energy technologies that are more efficient than current technologies, thereby altering the 
institutional framework and encouraging large-scale growth. Scholars such as Robert Stavins and 
Howard Geller have suggested a series of policy recommendations to remove these market 
barriers, however, none to my knowledge thus far mention amending the Constitution or 
creating a new government funded organization to represent the people’s goods as I have 
suggested based on this model. Following a discussion of the logic and reasoning behind this 
proposed solution, I explain why it may not work and explore more realistic solutions that also 
fit the model. 
 
Constitutional Amendment and a  
New Player in the Game 
The United States celebrates July 4th to commemorate the signing of the Declaration of 
Independence. In that document, Thomas Jefferson wrote that citizens of the United States 
have the right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” said unalienable rights. This idea 
was taken from John Locke, who actually wrote of the right to life, liberty, and estate. Jefferson 
had replaced “estate” (or property) with “the pursuit of happiness” because he thought property 
was too closely tied to feudalism, which could potentially be diverging from the idea of liberty.cii 
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Not discrediting Jefferson’s inclusion of “the pursuit of happiness,” but perhaps he should have 
not manipulated John Locke’s insight. Locke’s idea of property is very important in the creation 
of markets, which modern economies are based around. Public goods that are shared by us all 
are the people’s forgotten property and are not mentioned in all of the Declaration of 
Independence, original Constitution, Bill of Rights, or subsequent amendments to the 
Constitution. Why? When economic agents are able to use goods whose title is not defined in 
any of the country’s primary institutional documents, how can anyone expect the outcome to be 
sustainable? The unalienable rights Jefferson noted should read: life, liberty, the pursuit of 
happiness, and the legal protection of public goods and private property. 
 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in the Bill of Rights, reads that: 
“No person shall… be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” This statement mentions 
private property but does not mention public goods. Without mentioning public goods the 
institutional framework that evolves around this restriction regarding private property will not 
have any reason not to exploit public goods. Therefore, I propose an amendment be made to 
the document which all must abide by in the United States that declares the existence of and 
assigns title to the citizens’ public goods. The amendment, which I hope will later be critiqued 
and improved upon, will look something like this: 
 
An Amendment for the protection of the public goods belonging to the citizens: 
 
Section I:  
 Amendment V of the Bill of Rights shall now include this statement after 
the final line. “The public goods belonging to the citizens of the United States, 
including those that are not divisible and cannot be monetarily quantified or 
personally owned, such as clean air, clean water, and naturally occurring climate, 
shall not be negatively infringed upon or be exploited beyond an excessive level 
for public or private use by any one person or business organization without just 
compensation to the citizens of the United States.” 
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Section II: 
 The government is responsible for the creation of an agency to represent 
the citizens of the United States that is entrusted with the duty to seek out and 
prosecute violators of Section I, for the purpose of protecting and bringing one 
unified voice to the citizens who are not unified or incapable of action against 
those with superior budget and extra time to fight such matters in a court of law. 
Section III: 
 The just compensation awarded to the citizens by court of law through 
this agency shall be used solely to clean up the contaminated environment using 
best available technologies and to pay for the rehabilitation of human ailments 
caused by polluting agents. 
Section IV: 
 The leadership of this agency shall be chosen via national democratic 
election. All citizens eligible to vote for the President of the United States shall 
be eligible to vote for the leader of this agency. The chosen leadership shall hold 
no more than two terms, each term existing no more than three years. 
Section V: 
 Section I of this amendment shall be enacted into law no more and no 
less than a period of ten years after its passage for the purpose of allowing those 
who would currently be violators to have sufficient time to take the appropriate 
measures to be ready for the passage of this amendment into law. After this ten 
year grace period, there shall be no grandfathering of any one person, 
organization, or legal entity, thus prohibiting any further infringement against 
public goods belonging to the citizens. Sections following Section I shall be 
enacted immediately after passage for the sake of the new agency’s preparedness 
when Section I is finally enacted into law. 
 
Logic and Reasoning 
 Who do public goods such as the air and water belong to? Public goods belong to the 
people, but the people are many and these goods are vast. Divided the people are powerless but 
together they have a voice that is larger than that of the centralized, primarily fossil fuel based, 
energy distributional coalition. The government, representative of the people, should be 
responsible for creating an institution, or a player, that represents the interests of public goods 
belonging to the people so that a presence could be made in a court of law when the people seek 
reparations for property rights infringements. Public goods cannot be protected against unless 
there is an incentive structure not to exploit them. Government should be responsible for 
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solving this problem of collective action which is causing this market failure because it exists to 
represent and act in the best interest of its people.  
 A Constitutional Amendment would give validity and title to the rightful owners of 
public goods, making it illegal to take and use them without paying—as is the case with private 
property—creating the proper incentive structure for beneficial societal evolution to take place 
via free market forces. Restructuring property rights would improve society’s adaptive efficiency. 
The creation of a government-backed organization, addressing the problem of the citizens’ 
collective action, to counter the centralized energy distributional coalition would level the playing 
field in a court of law, ensuring protection of the public goods belonging to the people. This 
change in property rights would be the catalyst for institutional change, as investors’ money 
flows away from centralized energy sustaining technologies and toward decentralized energy 
disruptive technologies. Top  down centralized systems would, over the ten year grace period, 
transform into bottom  up decentralized systems that are demand driven as opposed to supply 
driven, thus increasing efficiencies. Increased efficiencies, as explained in Chapter Two, will 
improve social welfare and spur large-scale growth driven by disruptive energy technologies that 
no longer face high market entry barriers. 
 Vital to the success of this new system is the specification of recipients of the funds 
raised by the new organization through the courts. The funds raised could be designated for 
reinvestment in the infringing organization to “self fund” R&D for more efficient energy 
technologies, however, this would not create the incentives for free decision making and perhaps 
cause the creation of yet another distributional coalition. The just compensation belongs to the 
citizens for the purpose of fixing the problems caused by the infringement on public goods, so 
that the infringer pays the real total cost of producing their product, including its negative 
externality costs to society. This is why Section III designates that this compensation be solely 
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put towards the clean up of the contaminated environment (such is the case with waste 
discharges), and rehabilitation of human ailments caused by the polluting agents (such is the case 
with respiratory ailments).  
 This organization is meant to be representative of the people and not be influenced by 
the heavy hand of interest groups, which is why the President of the United States is not nor is 
any other individual given the power to elect its leadership, as in the case of the Federal Reserve 
Chairman or Supreme Court Justices. The citizens of the United States should be allowed to 
vote for such a candidate in a democratic election to facilitate appropriate representation. 
Naturally, this position may very well lead to the creation of various parties who promise to best 
represent the people. The potential downfall of this is that parties funded by the centralized 
energy distributional coalition will have superior funding to all other parties. The issue that needs 
more thought, and thus not mentioned in this Amendment’s first draft, is campaign finance 
restrictions, which has become a hotly-debated topic in modern politics. Logically, I leave this up 
for debate as it is unclear what type of campaign finance system will best suit this situation. The 
three-year term life is intended to allow sufficient time for elected leaders to seek out and 
prosecute violators of Section I. The allowance of no more than two terms is intended to 
promote new ideas and fresh thinking in and around the organization.  
 Tinkering with the institutional building blocks of an economy will cause short term 
instability if appropriate counter measures are not taken. Shocking the system could prove more 
detrimental than beneficial. This is the logic behind the ten-year grace period between the 
passage of this amendment and the enactment of Section I into law. Arbitrary as it may seem, 
the ten-year period is taken from recent history during the 1990s when it took roughly ten years 
for personal computers to become mainstream means of communication, commerce, and 
information. Given sufficient warning, businesses will have a definite timeline to reorganize and 
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reinvest in order to be in compliance with the new law as decentralized energy technologies 
become the mainstream energy providers. If there were no grace period, grandfathering would 
be necessary so as to allow some cushion for the economy to sustain such a dramatic change in 
investment. However, since there is a ten-year grace period, grandfathering is prohibited because 
the goal is to maintain an aggressive and smooth transition for overall economic and social 
benefit. 
 
Why This Conclusion May Not Work…  
Finding a Compromise 
 
Based on the outcome from the analysis of current energy institutions through the 
theoretical model, my personal recommendation is a Constitutional Amendment. However, I 
also recognize that since the 1970s the government has, with the CAA (1970) and FWPCAA 
(1972), attempted to solve the collective action problems caused by undefined property rights 
for public goods. Solutions have allowed agents to discharge through command and control 
schemes or technology based emission standards, permitting, and giving away tradable permits. 
Although these efforts have not always been imposed to the best of the government’s ability, 
they have in fact been used. The problem with setting very strict or zero emission standards for 
all contributing agents, as per the Constitutional Amendment, is that the date for which 
standards are set would likely be pushed back, if it is even technologically possible. For example, 
if the ten-year grace period detailed above was not enough time for decentralized energy 
technologies to supersede centralized energy, would the government bring the economy to a halt 
by telling companies to shut down power plants? No. The new unachievable standards would be 
postponed. Achievable goals must be set in order to solve the problems. 
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 The opportunity cost of the primary goal needs to be weighed with what is being given 
up in the transition process. Where is the compromise between the conclusion drawn from the 
model and reality? The physical problems previously identified must be re-identified. 
1. Producers not paying the total cost of energy production. 
2. Public goods being taken without compensation. 
3. Collective action problem about public goods. 
4. Perpetuation of the socially inefficient centralized energy distributional coalition. 
5. Lack of investment in socially efficient decentralized energy technologies. 
 
The goal, than, is for legislation to address all five of these problems within the confines of the 
model and reality. Harvard economist Robert Stavins identifies four categories of market 
instruments to address the externality issue: tradable permits, charge systems, government 
subsidy cuts, and reductions of ‘market frictions,’ which are similar to the frictions referred to in 
Chapter Two. 
 Tradable permits are a tried and tested market approach to solving all five of these 
problems: 
Under a tradable permit system, an allowable overall level of pollution is 
established and allocated among firms in the form of permits. Firms that keep 
their emission levels below their allotted level may sell their surplus permits to 
other firms or use them to offset excess emissions in other parts of their 
facilities.ciii 
The stringent tradable permit scheme for SO2 written into the Clean Air Act in the early 1990s 
was a great success in combating acid rain. Due to differences in abatement costs among 
emitters, this approach gave rise to cost savings on the level of $1 billion per year over the 
1990s. In fact, industry actually cut SO2 emissions by more than the law specified.civ Some 
ecologists have even argued that the cap is too low, indicating that industry could have sustained 
a more stringent cap while still saving the country money. Specific approaches to emissions 
permitting solve each of the five specified problems above. By setting emission caps and 
auctioning off tradable permits, the ones generating energy would be forced to pay for the public 
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goods that they are using as with any other resources input, raising the cost of producing their 
product without any grandfathering. Tradable permits encourage decentralized decision making 
that is technologically non-specific, allowing producers to either pay the cost for abatement 
technologies, or purchase a permit for their emissions. Producers are then paying the real total 
cost of production and the used public goods are being paid for. The government, by assuming 
the right to manage the sale of public goods, solves the problem of collective action. Stringent 
emission caps that dramatically increase production costs will force producers to raise the cost of 
purchasing the product, making such products less price competitive and cause investment to 
flow toward alternative energy technologies—solving the last two problems. Although there are 
historical examples where stringent emission caps have resulted in postponing standards, the 
model indicates that the investment shift may cause disruptive technologies to finally break 
down the barriers to market entry. Therefore, stringent emission cap and trade programs similar 
to SO2 trading in the 1990s fit the theoretical model and solve all five problems. 
 Green taxes are another solution to the problem of externalities that get “the prices of 
goods and services to reflect their true environmental impacts… The guiding principle is that the 
polluter pays for the harm that his actions contribute to the environment.”cv Taxing specific 
types of fuels or emissions would solve most of the five problems and lead to conservation of 
air and water usage. Producers would pay the total cost of their product and public goods would 
be paid for. Perpetuation of the centralized energy distributional would depend on how high the 
taxes are and how much investment actually flowed towards new technologies as a result of the 
taxation. Stavins indicates that identifying an appropriate tax rate is challenging for law-makers: 
“Ideally, it should be set equal to the marginal benefits of cleanup at the efficient level of 
cleanup, but policy makers are more likely to think in terms of a desired level of cleanup, and 
they do not know beforehand how firms will respond to a given level of taxation.”cvi Also, 
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Vaitheeswaran notes that green taxes are “too often blunted by blanket exemptions granted for 
heavy industry on such bogus pretenses as preserving ‘national competitiveness’….”cvii Although 
green taxes have worked in situations in which a government has wanted to influence a 
particular technological outcome, such as Europe’s phase-out of leaded gasoline during the 
1980s, the act of taxation conflicts with the models guidelines because it targets specific 
technologies. 
 Subsidies that attempt to get prices right “are probably the single biggest distortion of 
the markets in the developed world.”cviii Subsidy reductions (or elimination) to both nuclear and 
fossil fuel based players in the centralized energy industry are a step in the right direction toward 
achieving these five goals because they often have a tendency to “promote economically 
inefficient and environmentally unsound practices.”cix Reducing subsidies will not solve all of the 
five problems but this action is necessary for fixing market matrices to foster institutional 
evolution that is beneficial to society. In Chapter Two, I discussed market frictions as being an 
accumulation of laws, taxes, and subsidies that are technologically specific, causing an outcome 
that distorts the free-flowing nature of a market. This can potentially cause the market to clear at 
an equilibrium where marginal social cost does not equal marginal social benefit because 
producers are not paying the total cost of production and the playing field is not level for all law 
abiding players. Technologies that may be more sustainable for economic growth would fall to 
the wayside as the centrally assisted technological outcome will prevail, leading to unsustainable 
rapid growth.  
 Stavins also refers to a reduction of market frictions as sound market-based policy 
instruments to address environmental problems. The market frictions that Stavins refers to share 
some similarities with those defined in Chapter Two but are in fact different: 
(1) market creation for inputs/outputs associated with environmental quality…  
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(2) liability rules that encourage firms to consider the potential environmental 
damages of their decisions; and (3) information programs, such as energy-efficiency 
product labeling requirements.cx
What Stavins cites are not actually frictions, they are policy responses to frictions that exist either 
because of outdated regulations, improper utilization of public goods, or inadequate market 
information. Each of these policy responses to market frictions fit the theoretical model and 
solves at least one of the five problems. 
 The first friction reduction Stavins refers to is precisely what this thesis has been calling 
for: further deregulation in the retail energy industry so that previously monopolized regions are 
opened up to competition from new firms and sources of generation. Stavins notes that the 
primary arguments for restructuring are: 
(1) the electricity industry is no longer a natural monopoly, since small generation 
technologies are now competitive with large centralized production; (2) 
consumers will benefit from buying cheaper electricity from more efficient 
producers, who currently face significant barriers to entry; and (3) the old system 
with cost-of-service pricing provides poor incentives for utilities to reduce costs 
(Brennan et al. 1996).cxi 
As deregulation occurs, new markets are created for more efficient decentralized energy 
producers that drive prices down and are beneficial for the environment.  
 Stavins’ second response to market frictions, liability rules, provides “strong incentives 
for firms to consider the potential environmental damages of their decisions. In theory, a liability 
rule can be cost effective as a policy instrument, because technologies or practices are not 
specified.”cxii Liability rules fit perfectly into the model because there is no technological 
specificity. These rules, however, are generally more effective in the case of hazardous waste 
spills and are the primary founding mechanism for the Superfund program. Liability rules may 
not be effective in the case of air pollution because one agent’s emissions that disperse into the 
atmosphere are not easily seen as in cases of hazardous waste spills, making the polluter 
unidentifiable.  
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 Stavins’ third response to market frictions is an attempt to create textbook style perfectly 
competitive markets. “Since well-functioning markets depend, in part, on the existence of well-
informed producers and consumers, information programs can—in theory—help foster market-
oriented solutions to environmental problems.”cxiii Increased corporate transparency by means of 
product labeling would give consumers the ability to see how socially responsible companies are 
that produce the products they purchase. The EnergyStar label for example indicates that a 
product such as an air conditioner or refrigerator is efficient. Another type of information 
program is a reporting requirement. Whether the producer is required to inform the government 
or the consumer about its production practices and products, the increased transparency allows 
the consumer to make better informed choices about their consumption. 
In conclusion, instead of suggesting an unrealistic policy such is the Constitutional 
Amendment calling for zero emissions, I compromise between the theoretical model and reality 
by suggesting a mix of policies. Aside from charge systems, or green taxes, each of the market-
based policies that Stavins outlines fits the model and to some degree solves the major problems 
identified above. Auctioning tradable discharge permits forces producers to pay the total cost of 
production, compensates for public good usage, solves the collective action problem, and raises 
costs for the socially inefficient centralized energy distributional coalition making other energy 
producers more competitive, thus giving investors an incentive to move funds toward socially 
efficient decentralized energy technology R&D. As stated in the model, the more stringent the 
permitting, the more incentive there is for investment in disruptive technologies that can lead to 
large-scale growth and an improvement in societal welfare. Permits that expire after a period of 
time allow the government to re-auction the same amount or fewer rights to use public goods. 
By re-auctioning fewer permits, the market price of usage will be higher. This can be a helpful 
mechanism for the government to control the rate at which energy prices rise and other 
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technologies to become competitive, or in other words, facilitate a smooth transition. 
Technology spillover that may occur as a result of decentralized energy technologies becoming 
price competitive could also help solve global emissions problems. I also support the reduction 
of frictions as referred to in Chapter Two—such as technologically specific taxes, subsidies, and 
legislation—that cause markets to clear at an equilibrium where marginal social cost does not 
equal marginal social benefit. This will correct inherent flaws in the markets themselves by 
leveling the playing field, allowing for free-flowing market transactions to decide which 
technologies are best for sustainable economic growth. Finally, I also support the policies that 
Stavins suggests in response to what he calls market frictions that exist either because of 
outdated regulations, improper utilization of public goods, or inadequate market information. 
Further deregulation in the retail energy industry will foster the development of new markets for 
decentralized energy producers, creating new places for investment as well as competition for 
centralized energy. Liability rules hold the wrongdoers accountable for their actions and are not 
technologically specific. Holding high accountability standards forces companies to put serious 
thought into their operations and forces them to be more risk averse when operations could 
potentially harm the environment. These rules, as previously stated, may not work in the case of 
air pollution. Information programs improve the flow of perfect information, a problem that all 
markets have, thus improving overall market efficiency. The model tells us that solving these 
problems will improve societal welfare by encouraging decentralized energy to replace 
centralized energy and cause large-scale, sustainable economic growth. Based on the restrictions 
of the theoretical model and reality, a combination of these policies should solve the five 
specified problems, thus achieving the primary goal. 
 
Policy Recommendations
96 
Areas for Further Research 
After outlining the theoretical model and analyzing centralized and decentralized energy 
institutions, four other particular areas stand out that deserve further research. First, similar in its 
centralized nature, an analysis of centralized oil institutions should be conducted through this 
theoretical model. Oil is a finite resource, whose derivatives provide the energy necessary for the 
majority of the world’s transportation. It is also a fossil fuel that is primarily centralized in 
volatile parts of the globe. As this thesis suggested, the transition from centralized to 
decentralized electricity generation would improve societal welfare, perhaps the theory would 
also suggest the same for a transition from a petroleum-based economy to a hydrogen-based 
economy. Second, further research should be conducted to find the actual dollar amount of the 
hidden negative externality costs associated with the combustion of fossil fuels. The goal of this 
research should be to find whether the costs are higher than benefits. Third, an analysis should 
be conducted on the economic benefits of a hydrogen-based economy. If the US made the 
transition to a hydrogen-based economy and became independent of foreign sources of energy: 
no more money would be going overseas for oil, dollars would be re-spent at home, and 
potentially less money would be spent on health costs associated with the pollution caused by 
fossil fuel combustion (this amount depending on the outcome of the second study I proposed). 
Finally, if the US made the transition to decentralized energy, would there be decentralized 
energy technology spill-over into developing countries? If there were, would this benefit the 
developing worlds where centralized energy has failed? Would our own leadership in solving 
problems at home be the solution to international public good degradation and eliminate the 
need for international treaties such as the Kyoto Protocol? 
Policy Recommendations
97 
Chapter Notes 
ci
 North (2005) 15
cii
 Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Life%2C_liberty_and_the_pursuit_of_happiness (04/10/06)
ciii Stavins, Robert N. "Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments." Prepared for The 
Handbook of Environmental Economics Mäler, Karl-Göran and Jeffrey Vincent. 2001. 4
civ
 Vaitheeswaran 210-211
cv Ibid. 211
cvi
 Stavins 4
cvii
 Vaitheeswaran 212
cviii Ibid. 212
cix
 Stavins 5
cx Ibid. 4
cxi Ibid. 34
cxii Ibid. 35
cxiii Ibid. 36
Appendixes
98 
Appendixes____________________________________ 
Appendix A 
 
Appendix B 
 
Appendixes
99 
Appendix C 
 
Appendix D  
 
Bibliography
100
Bibliography____________________________________ 
 
Bain, Dr. Addison. The Freedom Element; Loving with Hydrogen. Blue Note Publications, Inc. 
 Cocoa Beach, FL. 2002. 
BP. “Energy in Focus.” BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2004. 
Bragunisky, Sergey, and Grigory Yavlinsky. Incentives and Institutions; The Transition to a 
Market Economy in Russia.
Coase, Ronald. “The Problem of Social Cost.” The Journal of Law and Economics (October 
 1960) 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) – U.S. Department of Energy. The Changing 
Structure of the Electric Power Industry 2000: An Update. Washington, October 2000. 
Friedman, Milton. Capitalism and Freedom. University of Chicago Press. Chicago, London. 
 1962, 1982, 2002. 
Friedman, Milton and Rose. Free to Choose; A Personal Statement. Harcourt Inc. San Diego, 
 New York, London. 1980. 
Geller, Howard.  Energy Revolution; Policies for a Sustainable Future. Island Press. Washington, 
 Covelo, London, 2003 
Hardin, Garrett. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Debating the Earth. Ed. John S. Dryzek and 
 David Schlosberg. New York , NY: Oxford University Press, 1999. 23-34. 
Hawkewn, Paul, Amory Lovins, and L. Hunter Lovins.  Natural Capitalism; Creating the Next 
Industrial Revolution. Little Brown and Company. Boston, New York, London. 1999. 
Helpman, Elhanan. The Mystery of Economic Growth. The Belkhap Press of Harvard 
 University Press. Cambrisge, Mass., London, England. 2004. 
Bibliography
101
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Energy Indicators for Sustainable Development: 
Guidelines and Methodologies. Vienna, Austria. 2005 
International Energy Association (IEA). Findings of Recent IEA Work. Paris, France. 2005. 
______. Key World Energy Statistics. Paris, France. 2005. 
______. 30 Key Energy Trends in the IEA & Worldwide. Paris, France. 2005. 
______. Energy Technologies at the Cutting Edge. Paris, France. 2005. 
______. Mobilising Energy Technology. Paris, France. 2005. 
______. Competition in Electricity Markets. Paris, France. 2001. 
Macintyre, Andrew. The Power of Institutions; Political Architecture and Governance. Cornel 
 University Press. Ithaca, London. 2003. 
McAlister, Roy.  The Solar Hydrogen Civilization. American Hydrogen Association. Mesa, AZ. 
 2003. 
National Energy Policy Development Group. National Energy Policy. Washington: GPO, May 
 2001. 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). Hydrogen Transition Infrastructure Analysis.
May, 2005. 
North, Douglas C. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge 
 University Press, Cambridge, U.K. 1990. 
______.  Understanding the Process of Economic Change. Princeton University Press, 
 Princeton, NJ. 2005. 
Olson, Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action; Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Mass., London, England. 1965, 1971. 
______. The Rise and Decline of Nations; Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities.
Yale University Press. New Haven, London. 1982. 
Bibliography
102
Parfit, Michael. “Powering the Future”. National Geographic, Aug. 2005: 2-31. 
Rifkin, Jeremy. The Hydrogen Economy. Jeremy P. Tarcher / Penguin. New York. 2002. 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. Harper Perennial. New York, 
 NY. 1942. 
Stavins, Robert N. "Experience with Market-Based Environmental Policy Instruments." 
 Prepared for The Handbook of Environmental Economics Mäler, Karl-Göran and 
Jeffrey  Vincent. 2001. 
“Sunrise for Renewable Energy”, The Economist: Technology Quarterly. December 10, 2005: 
 18-20 
U.S. Department of Energy (USDOE). The Department of Energy Strategic Plan. Washington. 
 September 2003. 
______. Hydrogen Posture Plan: An Integrated Research, Development, and Demonstration 
Plan. February 2004. 
______. National Hydrogen Energy Roadmap. November 2002. 
______. A National Vision of America’s Transition to a Hydrogen Economy – To 2030 and 
Beyond February 2002. 
Vaitheeswaran, Vijay V. Power to the People. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. New York, NY. 2003. 
Williamson, Oliver E. “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead.” 
 Journal of Economic Literature Vol XXXVIII (September 2000): 595-613. 
 
